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INTRODUCTION
The story of Sir Thomas More, the former Lord Chancellor of
England' who refused to endorse King Henry VIII's ecclesiastical
proclamations, has become legendary fodder for historians 2  and
playwrights.3 The resulting plethora of literature is no doubt due to More's
extraordinary adherence to the theological principles that fueled his refusal
1 Incidentally, Prime Minister Tony Blair recently abolished the post of Lord High
Chancellor of Great Britain and replaced it with the Department for Constitutional Affairs.
Citizens of Great Britain had often complained that the post carries too much power, as the Lord
Chancellor is simultaneously a member of the Cabinet, a judge, and a legislator. See Frances
Gibb & Richard Ford, Supreme Court to be Heart of New Justice System, TIMES (London), June
13, 2003, Home News, at 6; Great Britain Abolishes Post of Lord Chancellor, ROANOKE TIMES,
June 14, 2003, at A6; Warren Hoge, Britain: Blair Shuffles Ministers, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
2003, at A6; Stephen Morris, 1,398 Years After Angmendus, The Lord Chancellor's Reign Comes
To An End, GUARDIAN, June 13, 2003, Home Pages, at 4.
2 See generally PETER ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE (1998) (providing an
extensive and detailed account of the events of More's life); R.W. CHAMBERS, THOMAS MORE
(1951) (depicting More as a martyr and a great statesman with consistent political ideals);
ALISTAIR Fox, THOMAS MORE: HISTORY AND PROVIDENCE (1982) (noting the significance of
More's death as perpetuated by his personal philosophy); J.A. Guy, THE PUBLIC CAREER OF SIR
THOMAS MORE (1980) (analyzing More's contribution to English society through his career
achievements and dedication to the law); JUDITH P. JONES, THOMAS MORE (1979) (assessing the
historical and literary significance of More's writings as a Christian contemplating death);
ANTHONY KENNY, THOMAS MORE (1983) (analyzing More's contribution to the "standard
English conception of the English character" through his service and scholarship); RICHARD
MARIUS, THOMAS MORE (1984) (depicting More as a complex, misrepresented individual tom
between religious beliefs and worldly concerns); LOUIS L. MARTZ, THOMAS MORE: THE SEARCH
FOR THE INNER MAN 64 (1990) (presenting factual account of the events surrounding More's last
writings and effect of the events on their content); E.E. REYNOLDS, THE FIELD IS WON: THE LIFE
AND DEATH OF SAINT THOMAS MORE (1968) (assessing More's effects on the Renaissance
Period and Reformation); E.M.G. ROUTH, SIR THOMAS MORE AND HIS FRIENDS (1934)
(emphasizing More's character as extracted from his own writings).
3 See generally ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1962) (recounting the latter part
of More's life and eventual trial and execution); ANTHONY MUNDAY ET AL., SIR THOMAS MORE
(1990) (including portions reportedly written by William Shakespeare). For cinematic
adaptations of Robert Bolt screenplays, see generally A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (Turner Home
Video 2002), and A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (Columbia Pictures 1966).
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to capitulate to power-a stance which ultimately led to his demise by
decapitation.4
Thomas More's legacy takes center stage each summer at St.
Dunstan's Church, Canterbury, England,5 where the martyr's head is
buried.6 This historical and physical connection to More has inspired St.
Dunstan's to sponsor an annual lecture devoted to More's teachings,
philosophies, and life.
The gracious invitation to deliver the 2003 St. Thomas More
memorial lecture at St. Dunstan's Church compelled me to study More's
life7 with particular emphasis on the impact of his moral convictions on his
professional decision-making. My research revealed the degree to which
his historic confrontations with Henry VIII and Thomas Cromwell have
continuing relevance to legal scholars and practitioners.8 This legacy, and
4 See Peter J. Galie & Christopher Bopst, Great Political Trials of the Millennium, 27
LITIG. 39, 41-44 (2001); Stanley L. Jaki, Patterns Over Principles: The Pseudoscientific Roots of
Law's Debacle, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 135, 154 (1993); Milton R. Konvitz, Civil Disobedience:
Reflections on the Contribution of James Luther Adams, 12 J.L. & REL. 9, 20 (1995-96); John T.
Noonan, Jr., A Catholic Law School, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1992); Stephen F.
Smith, Cultural Change and "Catholic Lawyers, " 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 31, 53-54 (2003);
David 0. Stewart, Shutting the Door, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1992, at 42. See generally Edward
McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Principled Resignation of Thomas More, 31 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV.
63, 72-73 (1997) (noting that More's demise was perpetuated by a firm resignation to his
religious principles, despite the effectual defiance of Henry VII's proclamations).
5 For a concise history of St. Dunstan's Church and its relationship to Thomas More, see
generally REV. HUGH 0. ALBIN, THE PARISH CHURCH OF ST. DUNSTAN, CANTERBURY, KENT: A
GENERAL HISTORY AND GUIDE (1979); see also http://www.hillside.co.uk/tour/d2l7.html (last
visited Sept. 16, 2004).
6 See ALBIN, supra note 5, at 5; REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 381. See generally JASPER
RIDLEY, STATESMAN AND SAINT: CARDINAL WOLSEY, SIR THOMAS MORE, AND THE POLITICS
OF HENRY VIII 284 (1982); The Catholic Community Forum, Saints: Thomas More, at
http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/saintt04.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2004) (citing the Roper
Vault at St. Dunstan's Church, Canterbury, England, as the place of burial for More's head).
7 Numerous works present a thorough analysis of More's writings and beliefs. See generally
Peter Ackroyd, More and Theology, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1055 (2002); Joseph Allegretti, The
Unity of Law and Religion: A Response to Ackroyd and Vining, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1065
(2002); William G. Bassler, More About More, 41 CATH. LAW. 297 (2002); Gaffney, Jr., supra
note 4; Stanley Hauerwas & Thomas L. Shaffer, Hope in the Life of Thomas More, 54 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 569 (1979); Thomas L. Shaffer, More's Skill, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 295 (2000).
8 See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND
DISCUSSION TOPICS 170-75 (1985) (distinguishing between personal morals and professional
morals and More's employment of both in confronting Henry VIII's proclamations); Gaffney, Jr.,
supra note 4, at 72-77 (contrasting different accounts of More's confrontations stemming from
his religious beliefs); Hauerwas & Shaffer, supra note 7, at 573-81 (noting the struggles modem
lawyers face in seeking hope and truth and balancing skill and power are identical to those faced
by More); Jaki, supra note 4 (discussing the manner in which More dealt with the changing basis
of the law); H. Jefferson Powell, Who's Afraid of Thomas Cromwell?, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
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the honor to deliver the St. Thomas More lecture, inspired this admittedly
modest Article.
In my view, Thomas More's professional life, which is characterized
most often by his refusal to endorse the objectives of King Henry VIII,
exemplifies the recurrent conflict between a lawyer's personal beliefs or
convictions and the professional expectations of the sovereign.9 I contend
that these two value systems are in periodic conflict for many who practice
law. Like More, most lawyers bring into their decision-making processes
personal beliefs that are moralistic in character and endemic to their sense
of personhood. These beliefs, which I also refer to as moral codes, often
have their genesis in a higher, even Divine authority. This certainly was
true for Thomas More, whose personal beliefs were grounded in
ecclesiastical and theological principles.l0
Personal beliefs are often tested in the legal profession. Adherence to
these beliefs might prove difficult if professional expectations compel a
counter-response.' 1 A lawyer caught in this dilemma must choose one of
393, at 402-05 (1999) (addressing More's belief in the existential origin of law); Shaffer, supra
note 7, at 298 (noting that More used hope as a skill in his practice of law); Smith, supra note 4,
at 52-54 (describing More's incorporation of personal convictions into the practice of law);
Michael E. Tigar, Rationing Justice: What Thomas More Would Say, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY
LEGAL ETHICS 187, at 192-95 (1999) (comparing More's dilemma concerning Henry VIII's
proclamations with modern problems faced by the author and attorneys in general).
9 Part I of the Article provides a detailed background of Thomas More's historic refusal to
accede to the wishes of his sovereign, Henry VIII, and examines closely the conflict between
personally held convictions and pragmatic considerations related to professional convenience.
10 See CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 395 (declaring More a "hero of the Catholic" faith who
died for principles of unity and discipline); Fox, supra note 2, at 147 (discussing More's concern
that orthodox beliefs and practices embody the right perception); GUY, supra note 2, at 154-55
(hypothesizing which beliefs More would have supported and which he would have rejected);
KENNY, supra note 2, at 61 (chronicling More's fight for orthodoxy and against heresy);
Ackroyd, supra note 7, at 1055 (citing More as "the greatest embodiment of law and theology
assimilated"); see also MARIUS, supra note 2, at 331 (discussing More's arguments for the
"sacred traditions of the Catholic Church").
11 See Richard S. Markovits, Taking Legal Argument Seriously: An Introduction, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 317, 329 (1999) (noting that Robert Bolt's More saw Cromwell as a pragmatist,
using legal arguments only to achieve administrative effectiveness); Powell, supra note 8, at
393-94 (noting that Bolt's Cromwell saw religious convictions as a personal impediment to
achieving administrative expedience); Shaffer, supra note 7, at 302 (describing the law as elastic
and always subject to those with the power to impose changes); Smith, supra note 4, at 53
(noting the citizens' plain disregard of Catholic duties as Henry VIII's concerns were given
preference over those of the Church); see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in
America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 930-31 (1997). Professor Bilder notes that the Act ending all
appeals to the Pope and declaring Henry VIII the supreme head of the Church of England was
justified by a declaration that appeals "were often brought for 'the delay of justice' and created
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two alternatives: like Thomas More, she might adhere strictly to her
beliefs and suffer the consequences from her failure to accommodate the
sovereign's goals; 12 alternatively, she might take a more pragmatic stance
that accommodates professional expectations without the complete
abandonment of personal beliefs. Of course, compromise, depending upon
the extent to which beliefs are abandoned, may lead to cognitive
dissonance, 13 which many, including presumptively More, could not
tolerate.14
'great inquietation, vexation, trouble, cost and charges."' Id. at 930 (quoting For the Restraint of
Appeals Act, 1532, 24 Hen. 8, c. 12 (Eng.)). As history has shown, however, this was clearly a
tool to distance the King from papal influence and effectuate his divorce from Catherine of
Aragon. But see B.W. BECKINGSALE, THOMAS CROMWELL, 144-55 (1978) (noting that some
biographers have described Cromwell as a religious reformer, devoted to the advancement of the
Gospel).
12 1 employ the term "sovereign" to connote one who has authority over some grouping of
individuals. Of course, this more liberal interpretation includes not only conventional,
authoritarian figures such as monarchs, elected officials or other heads of government, but also
those in positions of power over individuals such as employers, supervisors, and evaluators. For a
discussion of the jurisprudential significance of the sovereign in terms of positive law, see infra
notes 67-96 and accompanying text.
13 See Kenneth A. Sprang After-Acquired Evidence: Tonic for an Employer's Cognitive
Dissonance, 60 Mo. L. REV. 89, 141 (1995) (explaining the theory of cognitive dissonance as
based on three premises: (1) a person is able to manipulate or modify his beliefs regarding certain
circumstances or information so that those beliefs are compatible with the person's personal
preferences; (2) people seek out information that will confirm or augment desired beliefs; and (3)
once beliefs are formed in the context of cognitive dissonance reactions, they persist over time);
Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Note, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the
Suppression of Mormon Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1295, 1312, 1316 (1998) (observing that in seeking to maximize the internal
consistency of his or her cognitive system composed of one's thoughts, attitudes, and beliefs, a
person will minimize cognitive dissonance, the divergence between action and belief); see also
James R. Elkins, The Moral Labyrinth of Zealous Advocacy, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 735, 788 (1992)
(opining that lawyers manage the cognitive dissonance created by their self-image of being a
good lawyer versus a good person by setting aside personal morals to take up the professional
amorality of the adversarial ethic); Kenneth A. Sprang, Holistic Jurisprudence: Law Shaped by
People of Faith, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 753, 753 (2000) (opining that a lawyer often resolves the
cognitive dissonance produced by a conflict between religious and professional morals by either
rationalizing that there is no conflict, seeking a balance between the two, or even leaving the
profession). For the cornerstone theorization on the effect of cognitive dissonance in predicting
complex behavior, see generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
(1957). For an analysis of Festinger's theory and its historical and potential application, see
generally JACK W. BREHM & ARTHUR R. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
(1962).
14 See REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 364 (noting that at his trial, More voiced his refusal to
accept the King's title as Supreme Head of the church because it contradicted with his belief in
the Divine Law); see also Katherine Corry Eastman, Comment, Sexual Abuse Treatment in
Kansas's Prisons: Compelling Inmates to Admit Guilt, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 949, 949-50 (1999)
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The clash between personal beliefs and professional expectations has
become a troublesome truism in the modem practice of law. For example,
if a lawyer believes that certain acts contravene deeply held moral
convictions, how could that lawyer in good conscience defend an
individual who admittedly committed one of those acts?' 5 If asked to
render a legal opinion that might stymie the will of the sovereign, would
the reviewing lawyer's ultimate opinion reflect an objective interpretation
of applicable rules, or will she manipulate those rules to ensure the
fulfillment of the sovereign's expectations?
6
Thomas More would have presumably advised attorneys facing these
questions to remain true to their beliefs.' 7 This advice, however, may not
(analogizing More's refusal to swear to the Oath of Supremacy as contrary to his own moral
convictions with the Kansas requirement that an inmate admit to a sexual offense in order to
receive good time credits as contrary to the Fifth Amendment). See generally FOX, supra note 2,
at 243-45 (noting More's final work, De Tristitia Christi, as a reflection on his desire for
martyrdom and the inevitable sacrifice in the name of God); RIDLEY, supra note 6, at 263-77
(recounting More's adamant insistence on the persecution of heretics and persistence to religious
convictions as described in his personal letters).
15 The adopted Rules of Professional Conduct for most states mirror those of the American
Bar Association. These rules generally require an attorney to defend her client with reasonable
diligence and competence, terminating that employment only for a narrow set of reasons or at the
conclusion of all legal matters. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1-1.3 (2003). The
District of Columbia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, Ohio and Oregon have adopted
versions of the American Bar Association's Model Rule 1.1, which provides: "A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Id.
R. 1.1; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980) [hereinafter "MODEL
CODE"]. California and Maine, however, incorporate no requirement for continued representation
and only require an attorney terminating representation to request permission of the governing
tribunal (if required by that tribunal) and minimize prejudice to the client by giving adequate
notice. See also 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1235 (2002) (noting a defense counsel's duty to
represent the accused within the bounds of the law); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
EC 2-29 (1981) (stating a defense counsel may not be excused from a court appointment in a
criminal proceeding based on a belief that his client is guilty).
16 See SHAFFER, supra note 8, at 171 (noting the political, not theological, basis for the
divergence between the perspectives of More and Thomas Cromwell); Hauerwas & Shaffer,
supra note 7, at 579 (contrasting More's adherence to legal principles with Thomas Cromwell's
compromising of those principles in order to achieve "convenience"); Powell, supra note 8, at
407 (contrasting More's view of the law as firm principles necessary to preserve societal stability
with Cromwell's view of the law as a malleable device with which those in power may create a
stable society); see also H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and
Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 501, 507 n.24
(1986) (noting More's awareness of the pliability of the law as expressed in his most famous
work "Utopia").
17 For a description of More's strict adherence to his system of beliefs, see generally
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be adequate in every contemporary context. Reconciliation of the clash
between personally held beliefs and professional expectations largely
depends upon the strength of the individual's conviction, the costs
associated with adherence to those convictions, and the feasibility of
forging a compromise that accommodates professional expectations
without the abandonment of personal beliefs. Appreciation of this triad of
contingencies, coupled with analysis of Thomas More's now legendary
story, should lead to more prudent decision-making as practitioners
confront, and possibly resolve this dilemma of conscience.
Part I of this Article commences with a jurisprudential analysis of the
competing value systems that led to Thomas More's confrontation with
Henry VIII and Thomas Cromwell. More's strictly held belief in
theological dogma suggests that he was a natural law thinker. These
beliefs, which are closely linked to the concept of a deity, together with his
keen understanding of theological rules18 and his adroit lawyering skills,
made fulfillment of Henry VIII's and Cromwell's expectations virtually
impossible. Part I also describes Henry VIII's Acts of Supremacy and
Succession as positive laws, and Cromwell's pragmatic, contextual attempt
to persuade More to endorse the King's Acts. The variant features of these
competing beliefs explain, to some extent, More's historic clash of
personally held beliefs and professional expectations. To demonstrate the
modem day prevalence of conflicting beliefs, Part II of the Article presents
a personal narrative from my career as a practicing lawyer. That
experience, though admittedly not universal, demonstrates the
contemporary reality of the conflict between personally held beliefs and
professional expectations. Part II then employs cognitive dissonance
theory to explain the decision-making influenced by conflicting beliefs.
This analysis confirms that individuals attempt to reduce the dissonance
associated with contradictory beliefs through various contextual remedies,
Ackroyd, supra note 7; Bassler, supra note 7; Hauerwas & Shaffer, supra note 7; Shaffer, supra
note 7; and Gaffney, supra note 4.
18 Many of More's writings focused on his theological ideals and his view on the fate of
heretics. See generally ST. THOMAS MORE, A Dialogue Concerning Heresies, in 6 THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS MORE 1 (Thomas M.C. Lawler et al. eds., Yale Univ. Press,
1981) (1529) [hereinafter COMPLETE WORKS]; ST. THOMAS MORE, A Dialogue of Comfort
Against Tribulation, in 12 COMPLETE WORKS I (Louis L. Martz & Frank Manley eds., Yale
Univ. Press, 1976) (1534); ST. THOMAS MORE, De Tristitia Christi, in 14 COMPLETE WORKS 1
(Clarence H. Miller ed., Yale Univ. Press. 1976) (1535); ST. THOMAS MORE, Responsio ad
Lutherum, in 5 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS MORE 1 (John Headley ed., Yale Univ.
Press, 1969) (1523); ST. THOMAS MORE, The Apology, in 9 COMPLETE WORKS 1 (J.B. Trapp ed.,
Yale Univ. Press, 1979) (1533).
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including compromise. The Article ultimately concludes that the search
for truly effective dissonance-reduction remedies commences with a more
complete understanding of what leads to a clash of beliefs, and the thought
processes required to resolve this clash.
Many lawyers today periodically grapple with conflicts between
personally held beliefs and expectations. I surmise that few possess
Thomas More's ideological resolve and, thus, struggle to reconcile these
conflicts, if reconciliation is indeed possible. Given this reality, my Article
will not proffer ineffectual, formulaic solutions. Instead, it advocates a
greater appreciation of both the prevalence of these conflicts and an
understanding of the fundamental differences of contrary beliefs should
contribute to more balanced decision-making by lawyers who confront
troublesome dilemmas of conscience.
I. JURISPRUDENTIAL ROOTS OF THE CLASH BETWEEN PERSONAL BELIEFS
AND PROFESSIONAL EXPECTATIONS
Comprehension of Thomas More's dilemma of conscience requires
analysis of the fundamental differences between personally held moral
beliefs, 19 professional expectations and objectives, 20  and contextual
19 See Norman B. Smith, Constitutional Rights of Students, Their Families, and Teachers in
the Public Schools, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 353, 373 (1988) (citing United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965), as an instance where the Court has interpreted humanistic and nonsectarian
moralistic beliefs as religious beliefs). But see Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of
Hope: Cultural Resources on Public Lands, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 477 (2002) (arguing that
personal moral codes are separate from religious beliefs). See also SHAFFER, supra note 8, at 174
(noting the separation between an attorney's personal morality and the set of moral principles she
draws on in the course of her professional life); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Can They Do That?
Legal Ethics In Popular Culture: Of Characters and Acts, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1305, 1315 (2001)
(citing Thomas More and Atticus Finch as examples of practitioners who exhibit a commitment
to personal beliefs); Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, M.D., God Told Me To Kill: Religion or
Delusion?, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 973, 1013-14 (2001) (arguing that a criminal defendant's
culpability is measured against society's standard of morality and not against the defendant's
personal moral code).
20 My reference to "sovereign" includes any individual who has command, power, or
influence over an individual, to the extent that such command, power, or influence potentially
affects the individual's judgment, choices, or behavior. An attorney's decision-making can be
influenced by a sovereign in the position of a client. See Amy S. Moats, Student Work, A
Bermuda Triangle in the Tripartite Relationship: Ethical Dilemmas Raised by Insurers' Billing
and Litigation Management Guidelines, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 525, 533 (2003) (arguing that by
limiting the number of billable hours allowed for a certain case, insurers often discourage or
prohibit their attorneys from pursuing beneficial courses of action); see also Task Force on
Lawyers as Dirs., ABA Comm. on Lawyer Bus. Ethics, The Lawyer as Director of a Client, 57
Bus. LAW. 387, 389 (2001) (noting that when an attorney representing an institutional client also
[Vol.78:965
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accommodations of a sovereign's goals or expectations.2' In my view, the
sits as a director for that client, financial dependence on the client could potentially influence that
attorney's judgment as to the best possible course of action); Janet L. Polstein, Note, Throwing
Away The Key: Due Process Rights of Insanity Acquittees in Jones v. United States, 34 AM. U. L.
REV. 479, 509-10 (1985) (noting the client's desire to plead guilty rather than face the indefinite
outcome of pleading insanity as superseding the attorney's judgment as to the best course of
action). Attorney decisions may also be influenced by the government or the judicial system
itself See F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the
Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L.
189, 209-10 (2002) (arguing that pressure from prosecutors, judges and court clerks to quickly
resolve cases may influence a defense counsel to accept a plea agreement that is not really in his
client's best interests); Kohei Nakab6 & Yohei Suda, Judicial Reform and the State of Japan's
Attorney System: A Discussion of Attorney Reform Issues and the Future of the Judiciary, Part 11,
11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 147, 159 (2002) (arguing that Japanese attorneys can truly help their
local communities only when they are free from governmental influence and authoritarian
pressure). A number of third parties may also have an effect. See Report of the Working Group
on the Influence of Third Parties on the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1841,
1843 (1999) (naming funding sources, regulators, boards of directors, employee unions, client
groups, family members, special-interest groups, adversaries, and the needs of the community as
possible third parties who influence the lawyer-client relationship). See generally Robert L.
Nelson, et al., Lawyers and the Structure ofInfluence in Washington, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 237
(1988) (arguing that Washington, D.C. lawyers serving as mediators between public interest
groups and elected representatives may perpetuate rather than resolve the conflicts between the
parties due to their strong ties to and handsome fees derived from the client group).
21 See HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 8:4 (2003) (noting the
contextual approach to contract interpretation as taking into account evidence extrinsic to the
agreement); Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. CoMP. L. 711, 755 (1994)
(noting that the dominance of a contextual approach to law in China's contemporary legal
practice is evinced by the continuing importance placed on social relations between parties to a
dispute rather than the application of positive law); Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and
Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 1073, 1076 (1994) (arguing that a contextual approach to dealing with issues
of capacity in dealing with elderly clients necessitates the rejection of paternalistic or libertarian
approaches); Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the
Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 653 (1995) (noting
that a contextual approach to a legal problem is less likely to reach simple, far-reaching
conclusions); Esther Vicente, Feminist Legal Theories: My Own View From a Window in the
Caribbean, 66 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 211, 226-27 (1997) (noting that postmodern feminists have
resorted to a contextual approach to the law, resulting in a pragmatic view of the "dynamic
process of conflict resolution"); see also Mark S. Scarberry & Scott M. Reddie, Home Mortgage
Strip Down in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy: A Contextual Approach to Sections 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5),
20 PEPP. L. REV. 425, 426 (1993). The authors argue that a contextual approach to the question
of whether mortgage strip-downs should be allowed under the Bankruptcy Code would
necessitate the analysis of applicable sections in the context of other provision of the Code,
legislative intent, the policies of the code, and other sources of law. They also argue their
contextual approach would "avoid the 'overly technocratic' reading of Acts of Congress." Id.
(quoting In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990)). But see William Twining,
Talk About Realism, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 329, 375-77 (1985) (disputing the idea of the "contextual
approach to law" constituting a separate philosophy or theory, but praising the habits of
2004]
ST JOHN'S LAW RE VIEW
clash of these values arises because of their respective jurisprudential
differences. Particularly in the case of Thomas More, beliefs, professional
expectations, and contextual accommodations fit generally within the
following jurisprudential categories: natural law, which is grounded in
tenets of morality; 22 positive law, which by definition is human
generated; 23 and contextual laws, which facilitate contemporary societal
needs or objectives.24
The differing positions and objectives of the protagonists in More's
historic drama are reflective of these jurisprudential categories of law and
legal interpretation. Summarily stated, Thomas More's moralistic beliefs,
which evince a strong nexus to theological dogma, appear closely
associated with natural law. 25 Henry VIII's proclamation as Supreme Head
of the Church as far as the law of God will permit,26 and his 1534 Act of
Succession that established his issue with Anne Boleyn as heirs to the
throne,27  function as positive law. Thomas Cromwell's quest to
accommodate Henry VIII's proclamations and his commensurate desire for
More to endorse the King's proclamations equate to rules formed from
context.28 As discussed below, these more western conceptualizations of
law and legal interpretation 29 form the ideological bases for the clash
experienced by More and, perhaps, many contemporary lawyers.
"think[ing] in terms of total pictures").
22 For more on natural law, see infra notes 39-66 and accompanying text.23 For more on positive law, see infra notes 67-96 and accompanying text.
24 For more regarding law and context, which is also termed "contextualism," see infra
notes 93-120 and accompanying text.
25 Many of More's writings indicated the depth and breadth of his theological beliefs. See,
e.g., sources cited note 18, supra.
26 See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 378 (noting the introduction of an Act of Supremacy in
1534 which proclaimed Henry VIII to be the Supreme Head of the Church of England); see also
KENNY, supra note 2, at 80; MARIUS, supra note 2, at 379; REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 326.
27 See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 356 (noting the passage of the Act of Succession in 1534,
which proclaimed Henry VIII's marriage to Catherine of Aragon to be void and annulled); see
also KENNY, supra note 2, at 70; MARIUS, supra note 2, at 458; REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 296;
ROUTH, supra note 2, at 201.
28 See Powell, supra note 8, at 404 (noting Cromwell's efforts to "bend, break, or transform
the law in [his] pursuit of an heir to the throne"). See generally BECKINGSALE, supra note 11
(noting Cromwell's satisfaction of the King's interests by winning the support of those below
him necessary to carry out the King's royal policies). The author also notes Cromwell's persistent
pursuit of power and his ability to manipulate that power to move up in the ranks of hierarchal
authority. Id.
29 The concept of western law, which typifies law observed in the United States, has been
categorized in the three positions of natural law, positive law, and "law-in-context." See COSTAS
DOUZINAS ET AL., POST MODERN JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW OF TEXT IN THE TEXTS OF LAW 19
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A. More's Beliefs as Natural Law Conceptualizations
Thomas More's personal beliefs appear well rooted in theological
principles. His writings between 1499-1503 demonstrate the fervor with
which he believed in, and was committed to, religious tenets and
customs. 3° This is not to suggest that More's intellectual acumen was
confined to theology. 3' An exceptionally gifted student of several subjects,
his writings include a number of respected pieces in the classics.3 1
The study of ecclesiastical and theological doctrine, however, appears
to have been More's true, consuming passion. His knowledge of church
doctrine led to an appearance at the Church of St. Lawrence Jewry, where
his lecture on St. Augustine's De civitate Dei impressed many theologians
of the time.33 There was little doubt that More was consumed with
exercises of piety and belief in a higher Divine order of human existence.
34
(1991). For a more detailed description of western law and its relation to Eurocentric legal
principles, see Kenneth B. Nunn, Law As Eurocentric Enterprise, 15 LAW AND INEQ. 323, 339
(1997).
30 For a biographical treatise purportedly written around the time of More's lectures at St.
Lawrence, see ST. THOMAS MORE, LIFE OF PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA (n.d.). See also ACKROYD,
supra note 2, at 107-08 (arguing that the enthusiasm with which More treats the pious life of
Pico della Mirandola reflects his own enthusiasm for that life); MARIUS, supra note 2, at 37
(arguing that More's lecture on Augustine's "The City of God" evinced his serious consideration
of the priesthood and submersion in theology); REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 32 (noting More's
study of and admiration for the works of St. Thomas Aquinas); id. at 34 (noting More's letter to
John Colet in which he expressed his anguish in dealing with his own spirituality).
31 See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 41 (noting More's active study of the liberal arts while
attending Canterbury College in Oxford); MARIUS, supra note 2, at 15 (noting More's study of
the seven liberal arts that formed the basis for typical medieval education while at St. Anthony's
School in London); REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 27 (noting More's legal training at the Inns of
Court in London).
32 See generally ST. THOMAS MORE, The History of King Richard Ill, in 2 COMPLETE
WORKS 1 (Richard Sylvester ed., Yale Univ. Press 1963) (1513-18); ST. THOMAS MORE,
Utopia, in 4 COMPLETE WORKS I (Edward Surtz & J.H. Hexter eds., Yale Univ. Press 1965)
(1516).
33 See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 104 (noting that More was asked to lecture at St.
Lawrence Jewry); CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 82 (same); FOX, supra note 2, at 10 (discussing
More's lectures in Grocyn's church); GUY, supra note 2, at 4 (stating that Grocyn invited More
to lecture on St. Augustine's City of God); KENNY, supra note 2, at 7 (detailing how More
"mastered ancient Latin literature so well that he was invited to give a course of lectures on St.
Augustine's City of God"); MARIUS, supra note 2, at 75 (recounting More's lectures at the
Church of St. Lawrence Jewry); REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 31-32; RIDLEY, supra note 6, at 29;
ROUTH, supra note 2, at 24 (describing the growth in More's reputation, evidenced by his
lectures in the Church of Saint Lawrence).
34 See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 102 (arguing that More's devotion to the discipline of his
piety and beliefs was exemplified by his insistence of wearing a hair shirt); MARIUS, supra note
2, at 231 (noting More had a chapel in his home at Chelsea where he and the members of his
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So strong were his religious convictions that he contemplated entering the
priesthood.35  Erasmus, a close friend and confidante, commented on
More's commitment to theology and the religious order:
[More] applied his whole mind to exercises of piety, looking to and
pondering on the priesthood in vigils, fasts, and prayers and similar
austerities. In which matter he proved himself far more prudent than
most candidates who thrust themselves rashly into that arduous
profession without any previous trial of their powers. The one thing that
prevented him from giving himself to that kind of life was that he could
not shake off the desire of the married state. He chose, therefore to be a
chaste husband rather than an impure priest.
36
More's disappointment with corruption within monastical orders
37
failed to weaken moralistic beliefs that continually influenced his personal
and professional life.38
More's personally held beliefs, which were based upon theological
dogma, have a clear nexus with natural law. Perhaps most probative of
this point is natural law's commonly understood derivation from God, the
household would meet each evening for their prayers); id. at 232 (noting More's insistence on the
family's punctual attendance at church on Sundays and holy days and his spawning of
impromptu dinner discussions on the scriptures); RIDLEY, supra note 6, at 127 (noting More's
rigorous austerities and habitual self-punishment including retreat to seclusion for prayer and
self-flogging); Randy Lee, Catholic Legal Education at the Edge of a New Millennium: Do We
Still Have the Spirit to Send Forth Saints?, 31 GONz. L. REV. 565, 567 (1996) (citing More as a
man of integrity and piety).
35 See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 111 (citing More's inability to accept chastity as a
disincentive to pursuing the priesthood); REYNOLDS, THOMAS MORE AND ERASMUS 35-36
(1965) (citing a number of sources confirming More's consideration of the priesthood); see also
REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 33; RIDLEY, supra note 6, at 29; ROUTH, supra note 2, at 28. See
generally MARIUS, supra note 2, at 34-43 (recounting More's difficult choice between
priesthood and marriage and the historical context within which he considered his options).
36 REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 33 (quoting Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami
(letter 999) (P.S. Allen & H.M. Allen eds.)).
37 See Ackroyd, supra note 2, at 209 (noting More's "fierce attack upon the follies of
monasticism" in a letter to a monk named John Batmanson). But see WILLIAM H. HUTTON, SIR
THOMAS MORE 27-28 (1895) (writing "it is absurd to assert that More was disgusted with
monastic corruption... that he 'loathed monks as a disgrace to the Church.' He was throughout
his life a warm friend of the religious orders, and a devoted admirer of the monastic ideal")
(citiations omitted).
38 See Hauerwas & Shaffer, supra note 7, at 572 (describing More's life as a "Christian
lawyer's life"); Jaki, supra note 4, at 154 (noting that More valued religious norms over legal
norms); Powell, supra note 8, at 400 (describing More as "deeply nonpragmatic, systematically
and even stubbornly other-worldly"); Shaffer, supra note 7, at 301 (arguing that More's hope,
utilized as a lawyer's skill, was theologically based); Smith, supra note 4, at 54 (arguing that
More's faith "constantly inform[ed] and enriched[ed] [his] professional activities").
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Supreme Being.39  Natural law, thus, reflects the will of God and,
therefore, commands greater respect and obedience. 40  Natural laws are
endemic to human nature.4' Given their genesis from the Supreme Being,
which lies at the foundation of human existence,42 these laws sustain
humanity and actually become components of human nature.43 The
symbiotic link between the Divinity and human nature represents the very
essence of natural law.4  That linkage also provides natural laws with
presumptive validity, and commensurately compels greater deference for
these more Divine prescriptions. 45
Other conceptualizations of natural law emphasize the need for social
order and structure rather than a reflection of divine prescription.46 The
39 See DENNIS LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 70-71 (1976) (providing, as a characteristic of
natural law, that humankind and all matters of the universe are guided by gods and the spirits of
the supernatural). It should be noted that the view of natural law that I use in the analysis of
More's beliefs fits, for the most part, within Catholic tradition. Of course, other views of natural
law, i.e., Aristotelian and the "new natural law," exist. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
Discussion in this article, however, will be confined to the traditional view of natural law as
described in this section. Utilization of these alternate views of natural law to analyze More's
beliefs will be reserved for future scholarship.
40 DOUZINAS ET AL., supra note 29, at 4.
41 Id.
42 1d; see also Douglas Kmiec, Liberty Misconceived Hayek's Incomplete Relationship
Between Natural and Customary Law, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 209, 223 (1995); Daniel Westberg, The
Relation Between Positive and Natural Law In Aquinas, 11 J. L. & RELIGION 1-2 (1994-95)
(noting the characteristic of natural law as human law so long as that law is "derived from the
law of nature" and law that deviates from the law of nature cannot be considered natural law but
a "perversion of law") (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I, Q. 95, art. 2
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Bros., 1947)). Compare the tenets
of positive law as delineated more specifically infra, notes 67-96 and accompanying text.
43 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 102-03 (1980); Douglas W.
Kmiec, Behind the "Empty Cloud" of Autonomous Reason-Or Why It Doesn't Matter if the
Natural Law of Veritatis Splendor Is "Real Law", 39 AM. J. JURIS. 37, 41 n.19 (1994) (citing
Robert P. George, Natural Law and Human Nature, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 34 (Robert P.
George ed., 1992)); Thomas L. Shaffer, Human Nature and Moral Responsibility in Lawyer-
Client Relationships, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 23 (1995) (noting that natural law is rooted in
perceptions of human nature).
" See Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise
of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 434 (1987) (stating that religion "became the
source of inspiration.").
45 See Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and
Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923, 980-82 (1991) (discussing the relationship between natural law
and Christianity).
46 See DOUZINAS ET AL., supra note 29, at 19 (describing natural law as the "regularities of
the human and social order"); id. at 75 (claiming that "arguments for natural law do not have to
be based on theology"); LLOYD, supra note 39, at 82-83 (arguing that natural law could exist
even if God did not). For more regarding the change in the concept of natural law as it relates to
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maintenance of order and discipline through structure and fulfillment of
basic human needs become the fundamental goals of modem natural law.4 7
The legal structures of the United States clearly demonstrate the merger of
societal order and human rights. Perhaps the greatest paradigm of this
principle is the Constitution of the United States, which, as natural law,
"prescribes the right of self-preservation or life as well as the right to live
and develop in community. ' ' 8 As a consequence, natural law assumes a
higher authority that embodies both morality and rationality.49 Rational,
and perhaps more significantly, moral laws reflect a higher order.50 Instead
of nature, modem natural law focuses more upon ethics and morality.51
Morality and natural law are, however, symbiotic.52 Moral premises,
as subsets of natural law, have strong connections to tenets of the Supreme
Being.53 While morality may not be the exclusive litmus test for societal
European history, more specifically the European enlightenment, see Nunn, supra note 29, at
339-44.
47 See Nunn, supra note 29, at 339-40 (stating that natural law regulates human instincts
and desires); Williams, supra note 44, at 435 (describing the "need to establish foundations for
human values and knowledge independent of religion").
48 Kmiec, supra note 42, at 222. Kmiec also recognizes the importance of the symbiosis
between law and human nature in order for it to qualify as valid, natural law. Id. at 223. See
generally Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102
YALE L.J. 907 (1993) (providing an overview of natural law as a theory that influenced the
drafters of the Constitution).
49 See PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 51-53 (1992) (explaining
that natural law contains an objective element); Williams, supra note 44, at 435 (describing the
Enlightenment's effect on religious views).
50 See Westberg, supra note 42, at 2-3 (stating that "[t]he theory of natural law points to the
existence of some body of moral norms which can be used as a standard in assessing the positive
laws of a state").
51 See generally FINNIS, supra note 43, at 25-29 (discussing natural law as a foundation for
moral judgment); Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Natural Law Tradition: Comments on Finnis, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 501, 502-04 (1986) (observing the connection between classical natural law
theory and modem notions of morality and justice). This more modem movement away from
nature in natural law has been adopted by the critical pragmatists. See Daniel C.K. Chow, A
Pragmatic Model of Law, 67 WASH. L. REv. 755, 815 (1992) ("Critical pragmatism advocates a
form of natural law without nature.").
52 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 151-52, 181 (1961) (opining that there is some
nexus between law and morality). But see Rodney J. Blackman, There Is There There: Defending
the Defenseless with Procedural Natural Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 285, 287 n.3 (1995) (noting the
traditional way of looking at natural law is as "a 'metaphysical theory of law [which] pretends to
discover a natural law imminent in nature"') (alteration in original) (quoting HANS KELSEN,
PURE THEORY OF LAW 77 (Max Knight trans., 1967)).
53 See Anita L. Allen & Maria H. Morales, Hobbes, Formalism, and Corrective Justice, 77
IOWA L. REv. 713, 717-18 (1992) (noting Hobbes' theory of natural laws and listing the nineteen
such laws that are reflective of the commands of God and morality).
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norms,5 4 it certainly becomes a strong barometer of the legitimacy of those
norms. In terms of hierarchy, morality often takes priority over customs,
traditions, and of course, human-made proclamations.55
Natural law can check the legitimacy of human-made laws. 56 Human-
made laws are moral, rational, and, therefore, legitimate under natural law
principles if they promote human needs and foster a general state of well-
being.57 As a consequence, natural law, which preserves humankind and is
Divinely conceived, is manifestly fair and commands obedience. In the
alternative, laws or legal rules that are inapposite to human nature and the
constructs of natural laws are invalid and should not be followed.58  Of
'4 Other bases for societal norms include: God, positive law (law of the state), personalism,
social contract theories, and wealth maximization. See Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics,
Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1233-37.
55 See James T. McHugh, On the Dominant Ideology of the Louisiana Constitution, 59 ALB.
L. REv. 1579, 1587 (1996) ("Law is not properly speaking law unless it has a moral content.")
(quoting Shadia B. Drury, The Resilient Core of Natural Law, in LAW & POLITICS 5, 6-7 (Shadia
B. Drury & Rainer Knopff eds., 1980)).
56 See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 64 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 1991) (stating that "[t]he existence of law is one
thing; [but] its merit or demerit is another") (quoting JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 184 (1954)); see also Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative
Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76 CAL. L. REv. 779, 781 (1988) (opining that any
given set of moral principles can be employed to judge the validity of legal rules). Civil laws
generally constitute positive laws since they are created by people and enforced by a sovereign.
See Chow, supra note 51, at 815-16; Westberg, supra note 42, at 2-3; infra notes 82-86 and
accompanying text.
57 See DOUZNAS ET AL., supra note 29, at 19; Kmiec, supra note 42, at 223; Nunn, supra
note 29, at 338-40; see also supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
58 See Peter Berkowitz, On the Laws Governing Free Spirits and Philosophers of the
Future: A Response to Nonet's "'What Is Positive Law?", 100 YALE L.J. 701, 703 (1990)
(explaining that Martin Lurther King, Jr. refused to abide by civil laws that enforced racial
segregation because such laws were null and void). For additional discussion of the limitations of
natural law, see LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 1-12 (1987). I acknowledge
that my admittedly brief conceptualization of natural law is more reflective of the Catholic
tradition. The discussion of only this school of thought is not meant to suggest that it is the sole
embodiment of natural law. Aristotelian notions of natural law recognize natural law as a
universal law of nature that includes a natural justice and injustice that is binding on everyone.
See Albert M. Rosenblatt, The Fifty-Fifth Annual Cardozo Memorial Lecture: The Law's
Evolution: Long Night's Journey into Day, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2130-31 (2003)
(describing what Aristotle meant by natural law); Cames Lord, Aristotle, reprinted in HISTORY
OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 122-30 (L. Strauss et al., eds. 3d ed. 1987). Another view of natural
law which has generated considerable discussion is the "new" natural law, which emphasizes
basic, self-evident goods such as life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, religion,
and practical reasonableness. See FINNIS, supra note 43, at 85-90; Nicholas Bamforth & David
A.J. Richards, Religion and Contemporary Constitutional Rights: A Critical Analysis of New
Natural Law, at 63-68 (March 11, 2004) (unpublished manuscript). For other conceptualizations
of natural law, see EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN
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course, key variables in this checking function remain the personal beliefs,
views, and perceptions of those who evaluate the validity of positive laws.
The ultimate decision of validity, which depends upon the extent to which
positive laws conform to natural law objectives, may vary depending upon
the evaluator's interpretation of those laws.
If More's beliefs were rooted in natural law concepts of Divinity,
morality and rationality, then he could not, in good conscience, accept
rules which ran counter to those traits. 59  Henry VIII's proclamations,
generated by the monarch himself, seemingly lacked a nexus with Divine
prescription. 60 In fact, his Acts of Supremacy 6' and Succession 62 conflicted
directly with ecclesiastical and theological canons that undergirded More's
beliefs.63 Given the natural law leanings of More's beliefs and natural
law's theoretical superiority over "unnatural" laws, Thomas More had no
cognitive choice but to withhold his endorsement of Henry VIII's
proclamations. 64 As human-made prescriptions, the King's seemingly self-
serving proclamations 65 were subjugated by More's beliefs based in natural
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9-23 (Great Seal Books 1955) (1928).
59 Violation of beliefs that are morally and firmly entrenched in one's sense of self creates
the discomfort commonly associated with cognitive dissonance. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text (explaining cognitive dissonance).
60 See infra Part I.B (providing additional analysis of Henry VIII's proclamations as human-
made and, therefore, positive rather than natural law).
61 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing Henry VII's Act of Supremacy).62 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (describing Henry VIII's Act of Succession).
63 See supra notes 10, 17, 30, 34-35 and accompanying text (describing More's
commitment to theological principles and the religious order).
64 More's beliefs prohibited him from accepting the notion that any persons, other than the
Pope himself, could divest the Pope of his position as the Head of the Church. See ROUTH, supra
note 2, at 225-26, (noting More's proclamation at his trial that the Parliament had no authority to
pass the Act of Supremacy); see also REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 368 (noting More's affirmation
of an essential principle of the Church, namely that the authority of princes and states are set by
Divine Law). More's stance against sovereign power began when he spoke out against Henry
VII's feudal tax proposal while a junior member of the 1504 Parliament. See MARIUS, supra note
2, at 50-5 1. For other authors' accounts of this instance of More's defiance, see CHAMBERS,
supra note 2, at 87; REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 51-52; RIDLEY, supra note 6, at 33-34; ROUTH,
supra note 2, at 25.
65 See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 339, 378-79. The author notes that the Act in Restraint of
Appeals was passed to cut off appeals to the Pope in order to distance England from the influence
of the church. This was a precursor for the Act of Supremacy, which proclaimed Henry to be the
Head of the Church. Id. at 378-79. The motive behind the promotion of these parliamentary acts
was to open the door for a declaration of Henry's marriage to Catherine of Aragon as null and
void, an act the Pope would not perform. A Treason Act was subsequently passed, requiring the
execution of any persons found guilty of accusing the King of heresy for his assumption of power
in the Church or for refusing to acknowledge the King's power in that position. Id. at 379; see
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law. The dominance of More's natural law-based beliefs over the King's
proclamations, which were seemingly not Divinely inspired, reflected the
Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.'s view that human-made laws that are
incongruous with natural law prescriptions have dubious validity. As Dr.
King had observed in his Letter from Birmingham Jail 1963:
A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law
of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral
law .... [a]n unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law
and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law
that degrades human personality is unjust.66
B. Expectations of the Sovereign-Henry VlII's Proclamations as
Positive Law
Human-made laws that theoretically augment natural law's goal of
sustaining societal order generally constitute positive laws. 67 As human-
made covenants that regulate certain aspects of society,68 positive laws can
provide a utilitarian functionality to natural law principles.69
Henry VIII's proclamations, which Thomas More refused to
endorse, 70 constituted rules that were "human-made," a fundamental
characteristic of positive law. As previously noted, Henry VIII issued
proclamations designed to restructure societal order. His Acts of
Supremacy 71 and Succession,72 as human-made laws, contrasted sharply
also CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 248-51; MARtUS, supra note 2, at 215-16.
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail 1963, in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289 (James M.
Washington ed., 1986); see also Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
and Contract Theory: An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 79-82 (1998) (noting the
natural law basis for many of Dr. King's writings and speeches, and his view that human-made
laws are invalid if they contravene natural law principles).
67 See Berkowitz, supra note 58, at 703 (noting the characteristic of positive law as being
man-made and created by certain governing sections of society).
68 See FINNIS, supra note 43, at 234-37 (noting that "a person treats something as
authoritative when he treats it as... an exclusionary reason, i.e., a reason for judging or acting in
the absence of understood reasons"); Christopher L.M. Eisgruber, Justice Story, Slavery, and the
Natural Law Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 273, 319 (1988)
(stating that positive law is derived from natural law); Westberg, supra note 42, at 1 (noting the
distinction between derivation and determination of positive from natural law).69 See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 14, 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing Henry VIII's
proclamations and Thomas More's refusal to acknowledge them).
71 See supra note 26.
72 See supra note 27.
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with Thomas More's natural law-based beliefs which had their genesis in
Divine order.73
If Henry VIII's proclamations are not of Divine origin and, thus, are
not "natural, 74 then their legitimacy as positive law becomes arguably
suspect. A close nexus between human-made laws and natural laws, which
"preserve and foster the state of human kind," constitutes one form of
positive law from a Hobbesian standpoint.75 Therefore, laws that sustain
the natural virtues of humankind are positive laws which have significant
natural law overtones.76
Henry VIII's proclamations appear more tied to personal and political
ends than to a Divine order.77 To some, however, this quality does not
necessarily disqualify Henry VIII's proclamations as positive laws. From
an Austinian perspective, the source of rules issued by a sovereign power
has little to do with the designation of those rules as positive law.
78
Instead, a sovereign's will to encourage certain behavior constitutes
positive law which the governed constituency is compelled to follow. 79 A
sovereign's power to enforce compliance became the ultimate legitimizing
factors of those rules.80 This view of positive law arguably provides Henry
VIII's proclamations with legitimacy. As the sovereign who issued the
proclamations and possessed the requisite power to enforce compliance,
73 For an analysis of More's writings and beliefs, see supra note 7. For more on the genesis
of natural law-based beliefs, see supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
74 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Divine genesis of natural
law-based beliefs).
75 See Allen & Morales, supra note 53, at 717 (explaining Hobbes's view of law,
particularly natural law, as centered on the natural attainment of power, possessions and
reputation, and the commensurate desire to employ any means to attain those values).
76 Id. at 718. According to Thomas Hobbes, a scholar of jurisprudence, principles of natural
law vested the sovereign with the power to issue rules that carry out those natural law principles.
Id. at 717-18. Therefore, a more Hobbesian view of positive law focuses attention not so much
on the laws themselves and who drafts those laws, but more upon those laws' facility to foster
natural law-based principles. Id. at 718; see also GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. MARTIN,
JURISPRUDENCE TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 293, 442-43 (2d ed. 1995).
77 See supra note 65 (explaining Henry VIII's underlying motives for his proclamations).
78 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE AUSTINIAN THEORY OF LAW 1-3 (W. Jethro Brown ed., 1906).
79 Id. at 1-2.
80 Id. at 10-19; see also Chow, supra note 51, at 763 n.22 (1992) (stating that Austin
believed that "law was a set of rules embodying the desire of the sovereign expressed in a
command that others behave in a certain way, backed by the sovereign's power and will to
sanction disobedience").
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his Act of Supremacy and Acts of Succession constituted positive law in
the Austinian sense.81
Whether viewed from a Hobbesian or Austinian perspective, it seems
clear that human-made laws can have legitimacy regardless of their nexus
with Divine prescriptions. Positive law, in and of itself, remains the law of
will, and not necessarily the law as it should be under a natural law-based
concept. Positive law functions more pragmatically rather than
normatively.82 Thus, positive law need not reflect morality,83 but should
fulfill the more practical purposes of instilling respect for sovereign power
and preserving civility.84 The will, command, and authority of the human
sovereign become the central focus, not Divinity.85 Pursuant to this view,
laws are moral by their very issuance. Positive laws presumptively
command obedience since they constitute the legitimate dictates of the
sovereign. Respect for these laws arises concomitantly from a deference to
power, not from these laws' possible connection to any Divine order.86
In addition to their manifestations as expressions of sovereign power,
Henry VIII's proclamations had plausible validity. A key factor of this
validity is the potential of these proclamations to further societal order-a
key feature of positive law.87 The apparent opportunism of the King's
81 In addition to the nexus to natural law-based principles (Hobbes) and the will and power
of the sovereign to issue and enforce legal rules (Austin), positive law may also gain its
legitimacy through politics that could define and determine the extent of enforcement of certain
rules. See HART, supra note 52, at 49-120 (debunking sovereign power as the legitimizing source
of law and proposing the complexity of societal norms and organizations as the principle
foundation of modem legal systems).
82 See AUSTIN, supra note 78, at 96-116; see also HART, supra note 52, at 49-76.
83 See supra note 19 (explaining personal moral beliefs); supra notes 52-55 and
accompanying text (describing the symbiotic properties of morality and natural law).
84 See Westberg, supra note 42, at 6-8 (explaining that laws are aimed at the external life
rather than internal virtue).
85 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 11 (Isiah Berlin et
al. eds., 1954) (1832); see also Westberg, supra note 42, at 6 & nn.11-12 (explaining the
Thomist view of positive law as doctrine born of "human authority, not from natural or moral
law").
86 See Nunn, supra note 29, at 340; see also Rodolfo Sacco, Mute Law, 43 AM. J. COMP. L.
455, 456 (1995) (depicting positivism in totalitarian countries). Other scholars also question the
notion that positive laws affirm state power. See HART, supra note 52, at 181-207; Elizabeth
Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 18, 26-37 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern
Legal Thought: From Langdell and Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REV. 353 (1995).
87 See DOUZINAS ET AL., supra note 29, at 19, 75 (explaining the origins and evolution of
natural law); LLOYD, supra note 39, at 82-83. For more regarding the change in the concept of
natural law as it relates to European history, specifically to the European enlightenment, see
Nunn, supra note 29, at 339-44. See also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
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proclamations did not completely overshadow the potential functionality of
these laws within British society at that time.
Note that the resultant Acts of Supremacy and Succession were issued
by a monarch who had been tutored in the classics, and likely had some
instruction in clerical education.88 Henry VIII presumably had a measure of
knowledge of religious doctrine, which might have entered his thinking as
he proffered his proclamations. 89 This factor might have countered, to
some extent, the presumptive conclusion that the King's proclamations
were totally devoid of a natural law basis. Moreover, the King's
knowledge of religious doctrine contributed to the rationalized legitimacy
of his proclamations. Henry VIII's marriage to Catherine of Aragon,
required special exception to the longstanding Church rule that one should
not marry his brother's widow.90 The Church's willingness to grant an
exception to this rule stemmed from a political objective to strengthen the
ties between the Royal Houses of England and Spain, Catherine's native
country. 91  Henry VIII initially saw his marriage to Catherine as an
obligation that he ultimately surmised was a violation of Church law as
stated in the Bible.92 To correct this violation, he sought to dissolve his
marriage to Catherine in order to marry Anne Boleyn. The Church's
refusal to grant this request-a decision based on the goal to maintain
English and Spanish ties-likely heightened the King's awareness of
certain corruption in the church during that time.93 This apparent
corruption served as a pragmatic catalyst for, at the very least, his Act of
Supremacy. 94 Given these contextual realities of the Church and society
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970); DAVID
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (Archon Books 1965) (1911). For a more
comprehensive explanation of positive law and other jurisprudential tenets, see generally
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY
IN AMERICA, 1886-1937 (1998).
88 J.J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VIII 5 (1968) (noting that Henry VIII was tutored by poet-
laureate John Skelton, received instruction in the classics, and, according to Lord Herbert,
"received the beginnings of a clerical education").
89 See LACEY BALDWIN SMITH, HENRY VIII: THE MASK OF ROYALTY 100-01 (1971)
(stating that Henry VIII's faith was "ready made" and resulted from many prior generations and
"sanctioned by the weight of history.").
90 Prior to her marriage to Henry VIII, Catherine of Aragon had been married to Arthur,
Henry VIII's older brother. Robert Bolt, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS vii (1968).
, Id.
9' Id at viii.
93 Id. at vii-viii.
94 SCARISBRICK, supra note 88, at 246 (noting that the Church's need for reform during
[Vol.78:965
THOMAS MORE'S DILEMMA OF CONSCIENCE
during that time, the King's proclamations, thus, had potential utility and
legitimacy, despite their facially self-serving nature. As positive laws
issued by a sovereign seeking societal order, these proclamations
commanded respect and obedience.
95
Viewed as Austinian positive laws, however, Henry VIII's
proclamations, despite the monarchy's rationalizations of their
legitimacy, 96 inevitably clashed with Thomas More's natural law-based
beliefs. To More, Divinely derived law, which was the foundational
essence of Church rules, ranked supreme among the hierarchy of legal
rules. He seemingly viewed the King's proclamations as human-made
edicts that had an insufficient nexus to Divine order. He, therefore, could
neither follow nor endorse Henry VIII's proclamations, irrespective of
their arguable legitimacy under positivist norms. Despite the
consequences, More's only cognitive option was to remain true to his
natural law-based principles.
C. Contextualism-The Search for Accommodation or Compromise
Between Conflicting Beliefs and Expectations
As previously discussed, Thomas More's personal natural law-based
beliefs conflicted with Henry VIII's goals and expectations.97 This clash
contributed substantially to More's inevitable dilemma of conscience. Of
course, More resolved this dilemma when he rejected Henry VIII's
proclamations, favoring strict adherence to personal beliefs grounded in
natural law.98 However, conflict between beliefs and sovereignly issued
edicts need not result in stark absolutes, i.e., the complete rejection of
sovereign will or abandonment of personally held beliefs. Some
semblance of compromise might appease the sovereign without retreating
completely from personal beliefs.
Henry VIII's time was "manifest," and prompted the King to take some action against the
scandals that plagued the Church); see also H. MAYNARD SMITH, HENRY VIII AND THE
REFORMATION 53-54 (1948) (stating that Henry VIII knew that the Church had attempted to
draft new canons in response to the scandals that had occurred during that time).
9' See Nunn, supra note 29, at 340.
96 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing More's belief system as based
on natural law-based principles).
97 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (explaining More's reasons for refising to
endorse Henry Vlll's proclamations).
98 Rejection of Henry VIII's proclamations appeared to be More's action. See supra note 64
and accompanying text (noting More's failure to endorse Henry VIII's proclamations). However,
his failure to endorse yet not openly reject the King's wishes points more toward appeasement.
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Achievement of a sometimes delicate compromise typically comes in
the form of some type of contextual accommodation. The search for
compromise as a mechanism to avoid this conflict appears closely
associated with a form of jurisprudential law defined by context or
"contextualism." 99 As explained in more detail below, Thomas Cromwell,
who, as Henry VIII's secretary, 100 attempted to obtain Thomas More's
endorsement of the King's actions, appears as a broker of compromise.
Laws, rules, and their interpretations are derived from context.
Contextualism recognizes the realities and dynamics of human interaction
as integral elements in the creation of legal rules and the foundation of
reasoned decision-making. 10 1 Legal rules result from an amalgam of
policies, ideological assumptions and circumstances that give rise to
problems which those rules attempt to address.10 2  Contextual decision-
making, both in terms of the drafting and interpretation of legal rules,
relates strongly to realism, which encourages holistic application of rules
to social controversies. 0 3 To some, context is so endemic that decision-
making cannot be seen as totally objective. Social circumstances and the
impact of those circumstances upon human judgment make context an
unavoidable facet of reasoned decision-making. 10 4 Contextualism, with its
emphasis on the actual circumstance to which laws apply and are
99 See infra notes 101-109 and accompanying text.
100 See BECKINGSALE, supra note 11, at 106.
101 See Twining, supra note 21, at 372-77.
102 See id. at 373-74 (describing laws borne of context, yet eschewing the word
"contextualism" as an amorphous exercise).
103 Legal realism gained significant credibility in the early twentieth century, and
constituted the antithesis of formalism and conceptualism as reflected in the United States
Supreme Court case of Coppage v. Kansas. 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915), overruled in part by Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 717 (1941) (allowing workers to contract with their employees
without state interference). As a generalization, realism implores the recognition of the use of
social condition as a variable in decision-making, in lieu of mere reliance on legal rules, which
may advance outdated or dysfunctional policies. See G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical
Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 SW. L.J. 819, 821 (1986). In effect, realism
commands that rules be applied contextually in light of the effect of those rules on such factors as
wealth, class, and condition. For more discussion of the western conceptualization of law and
context, see Nunn, supra note 29, at 342-43.
104 See Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. C1N. L. REv. 171, 178 (1992); see
also Anthony J. Sebok, Note, Judging the Fugitive Slave Acts, 100 YALE L.J. 1835 (1991)
(explaining the different results in the Plessy and Brown decisions through the impact of context
on judicial decision-making).
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interpreted, also relates to such critical theories as interpretivism'0 5 and
humanism. 1
06
From the standpoint of contextualism, laws, rules, and the
interpretation of those rules are significantly influenced by social
conditions.10 7 Laws and rules are intertwined with human experiences, and
those experiences become factors used to evaluate the efficacy of rules.
10 8
Pursuant to this rationale, legal rules gain legitimacy and functionality
through their ability to adapt to, and address, the problems which arise
from those human experiences. This relational aspect of contextualism
appeals to both postmodernists and pragmatists.]0 9
Contextualism had particular applicability to the factual scenario that
produced Thomas More's dilemma of conscience. Thomas Cromwell
served Henry VIII in several key political offices that provided him unique
insight into the effectiveness of government and the need for reforms. 0
105 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1209-17 (1987) (providing a probative explanation of
interpretivism); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1085, 1104-06 (1989) (concluding that interpretivism promotes thinking about
similarities and dissimilarities in social contexts).
106 Humanism, as explained by natural law, incorporates human history and circumstance,
into the explanation of legal rules and their application. See Angela P. Harris, The Unbearable
Lightness of Identity, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 207, 215 n.26 (1996).
107 See Mensch & Freeman, supra note 45, at 932-33 (providing a detailed example of
context as it relates to decision-making and the consequences related to that decision-making);
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis
of Democratic Theory, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 359, 361
(Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1988) (stating that judges' decisions are not
based on deductive reasoning, but rather on social norms).
108 See Alexander Somek, From Kennedy to Balkin: Introducing Critical Legal Studies from
a Continental Perspective, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 759, 766 (1994); see also DOUZINAS ET. AL.,
supra note 29, at 20; FITZPATRICK, supra note 49, at 6-7 (opining that rules of law derive their
meaning and significance from society).
109 See Mensch & Freeman, supra note 45, at 1083. For more on postmodemism, see
Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and Judicial
Practice (with an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas Corpus Cases), 88
NW. U. L. REV. 1046 (1994), and Minda, supra note 86. Postmodernism has a close nexus with
pragmatism. See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996);
Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409 (1990); Richard Warner, Why
Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical Theory, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 535,
544 (1993). Pragmatism, which can be more feasibly described than defined, stresses faith in the
need for community and seeks to supplant the formalist conception of rules with more realistic
interpretive practices. Pragmatism has a central theme: the furtherance of social progress. See
ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR. & NANCY LEVIT, JURISPRUDENCE: CONTEMPORARY READINGS,
PROBLEMS, AND NARRATIVES 452-87 (1994).
110 See NEVILLE WILLIAMS, HENRY VIII AND HIS COURT 179 (1971) (stating that the
various offices Cromwell held while in Henry Vlll's service provided him with a "unique
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Serving as Secretary to the King, Cromwell doggedly sought to appease
Henry VIII. He not only supported the King's proclamations,'11 but also
sought Thomas More's open endorsement of those proclamations.
12
Cromwell, labeled a "pragmatic craftsmen," took a contextual approach to
the conflict between More and Henry VIII1  3 He allegedly saw the law as
"nothing but an instrument or a weapon."' 14 So pragmatic was Cromwell,
that some found him devoid of any legal conviction.' 
15
To dismiss Thomas Cromwell simply as an unprincipled pragmatist
without conviction, however, is somewhat superficial, if not extreme.
Cromwell was the quintessential contextualist, who likely viewed law as a
facilitator of social order. He believed that Henry VIII's dominion over
the Church would serve to unite England under one sovereign, and
contribute to an orderly society replete with pooled resources to minimize
poverty and waste, maximize wealth, and provide more citizens with a
sense of dignity and purpose."16  Towards this end, laws apparently
designed to further such utilitarian goals were generously interpreted."
17
position at the centre of the administration, and he could see the existing system as a whole,
compare anomalies, understand procedures and reach sensible conclusions about needed
reforms").
111 See supra notes 26-27.
112 See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 360 (citing Cromwell as sitting on the panel of
authorities known as the Lambeth Commissioners before whom More was required to appear and
assent to the proclamations by his giving of the accompanying oath); REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at
318 (noting that even after More's imprisonment, Cromwell allowed More's daughter Margaret
to enter the tower with the hopes of persuading him to take the oath); see also MARIUS, supra
note 2, at 453-54.
113 See Markovits, supra note 11, at 328-29 (noting Powell's analysis of Robert Boltz's A
Manfor All Seasons, where Powell refers to Thomas Cromwell as one who takes law seriously in
"only the pragmatic-craftsmen and 'social importance' senses").
114 Id. at 329 (quoting Powell, supra note 8, at 405).
115 See id. (describing Powell's analysis of Cromwell as a died-in-the-wool pragmatist who
sees legal arguments as "a grab-bag of conventional linguistic tricks") (quoting Powell, supra
note 8, at 406).
116 See MARIUS, supra note 2, at 380 (opining that Thomas Cromwell sought the King's
dominion over the church in, what he believed, would be the general betterment of society).
117 BECKINGSALE, supra note 11, notes Cromwell's contextualist ideals and his utilization
of the law to defeat the King's adversaries:
The advantage which Cromwell enjoyed over his opponents was that he had realised
his view of the realm as an Empire in law.... Fisher and More did not have to be
defeated in argument, merely convicted by the law. .... It was through the enforcement
of the law that Cromwell was able to argue his case.
Id. at 39. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text (citing to the definition of
contextualism).
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Cromwell seemingly believed that the maintenance of social order related
also to the fulfillment of the sovereign's will, a belief that compelled
strategic action in furtherance of the will of the sovereign. Assertion of the
King's supremacy over the Church appeared to create a greater sense of
national sovereignty that might bring about greater societal good.1 18
Cromwell's decision to view Henry VIII's proclamations as guarantors of
social order manifested the humanism that is such an integral feature of
contextualism.11 9 Blind faith in the sovereign's will as insurer of societal
order remained a speculative, and, perhaps, risky judgment.
As history and Bolt's play document, Cromwell's contextual
approach attempted to persuade More to accommodate Henry VIII's
proclamations. 120  He sought to achieve a compromise between More's
dominant, personally held beliefs, and the King's expectations. In fact,
Cromwell allegedly tried vainly to persuade More against any direct
denunciation of the King's proclamations, and "would rather have seen his
own son beheaded than be a witness to More's refusal.",121  More's
defiance, of course, underscored the depth of his natural law-based
beliefs. 122 His rejection of Cromwell's approach, however, had far greater
118 See BECKINGSALE, supra note 11, at 40 (noting that the Act of Supremacy's potential to
create a national sovereignty required rejection of papal authority).1'9 This humanistic approach to decision-making within context also underscores the
possible failings of a contextual approach. If Thomas More's judgment that the King's
proclamations furthered societal order was erroneous, than all of his legal interpretations become
somewhat spurious. This contingency however, should not diminish the applicability of
contextualism. Even in the context ofjudgments on natural law, human judgment often times can
be fallible. Therefore, it is much more important to judge the overall intent of the decision-maker,
i.e., fulfillment of societal order, rather than the idiosyncratic views of motives associated with
the definition of order. This point is critical in the case of Cromwell, whose behavior, while
generated by concerns for societal order and good, were also tinged with self-interest. See SMITH,
supra note 94, at 47 (stating that Cromwell was practical, yet craved power and respect).
120 See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 387 (noting More's silence when asked to take the Oath
of Supremacy). The author also uses the simile of a "double-edged sword"; on one edge
damnation of More's soul, and on the other, damnation of his body. Id.; see also MARIUS, supra
note 2, at 461 (citing More as the first to refuse to take the oath); REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 300
("[Y]et unto the oath that there was offered me I could not sware, without the jeoparding of my
soul to perpetual damnation.") (quoting More); RIDLEY, supra note 6, at 274 (noting More's
refusal to accept Cromwell and the other Commissioners' invitations to take the Oath of
Supremacy); supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text (defining contextualism). See generally
BOLT, supra note 3, at 88-89.
12 ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 363 (documenting Cromwell's desire that More not counter
Henry VIII's goals and expectations).
122 More's beliefs contributed to his dogmatic loyalty to the rule of natural law. Powell, in
his analysis of Robert Bolt's A Man for All Seasons, summarizes the strength of this belief
system when he notes More's views: "Law ... [is] a social bond that unites us even when we
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philosophical significance. To More, laws, not context, formed social
bonds that sustained society. 123 Cromwell's contextualism did not preserve
social order, but instead detracted from society's more fundamental need to
adhere to law as a conviction rather than social convenience.12 4  More,
therefore, could not embrace any contextual response that caused
individuals to stray from the true letter of law, particularly Divinely related
law.
D. More's Tacit Embrace of Contextualism
Discussion thus far might suggest that Thomas More, in adherence to
his natural law-based beliefs, repudiated Henry VIII's positivist
proclamations. A careful review of his actions, however, indicates that his
repudiation may not have been absolute. Prior to his conviction for
treason, More never publicly denounced the King's proclamations.125 He
invoke it to resolve our disputes." "Society ... constitutes itself in part, in and through the law."
Markovits, supra note 11, at 329 (alteration in original) (quoting Powell, supra note 8, at 404,
405).
123 See id.
124 See id. Of course, views regarding Cromwell's more contextual approach to the law
vary. Some find Cromwell's pragmatic approach disingenuous to say the least. Most strident in
this group is Professor Jeff Powell, who discusses More's dismissal of Cromwell as a
"pragmatist, the merest plumber." See Powell, supra note 8, at 399-401. Powell further opines
that practitioners who freely embrace Cromwell's pragmatic and contextual approach to the law
have contributed to a cynicism in the profession among those practitioners, and a willingness on
the part of many judicial decision-makers to "reach the 'right' result at whatever cost to the legal
principle .... Markovits, supra note 11. at 330 (quoting Powell, supra note 8, at 408). While
the complete abandonment of legal conviction can be problematic, I fail to see Cromwell's
position as solely related to total abandonment. Law, which is born of context, actually requires
that situational and societal norms and human experiences be considered when law is interpreted.
The very essence and efficacy of the law depends upon its applicability within a complex matrix
of human existence. See Morant, supra note 66, at 103-04 (1998) (arguing that contextual
realities are inevitable criteria in thoughtful and reasoned decision-making). I, therefore, posit
that the embrace of contextualism is not in and of itself tantamount to the abandonment of legal
or moral conviction. Contextual references are inevitable in any kind of thoughtful decision-
making. The true evaluation of the merit of contextualism is related more to degree rather than its
actual implementation. As a result, contextual interpretations and applications of the law may
become more suspect when those interpretations deviate substantially from the essence of the law
or rules interpreted. Perhaps then a better way to surmise More's objections to the Cromwellian
approach is that in endorsing the King's proclamation, Cromwell deviated substantially from
those natural law principles that made up More's beliefs system.
125 Note that More never stated openly that the King's proclamations were wrong or counter
to his natural law-based beliefs. He merely stated that he could not endorse those proclamations.
Only at More's trial, and after he had been convicted, did he publicly address the validity of the
King's proclamations. See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 397 ("Seeing that I see ye are determined
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expressed privately, not publicly, his protest to the King's
proclamations. 126  As a contextual tactic, this unwillingness to openly
oppose the King arguably constituted a minimal accommodation. Public
silence, which did not violate More's natural law-based beliefs, 127 might
have functioned to appease the sovereign and fulfill some measure of will.
Yet More's behavior intimates the tacit adoption of a contextual
strategy during his struggle with Henry VIII and Cromwell. While More
never endorsed the King's proclamations, he refrained from open rejection
until after his conviction for treason. 128 Given the strength of his beliefs,129
and the King's clear violation of the natural law principles that were
central to those beliefs, one might surmise that More would have publicly
rejected the proclamations at the outset of the controversy. If natural laws
are integral to humanity,' 30 then they encourage actions that best foster
humanity. Certainly public rejection at the time Henry VIII's
proclamations were presented for ratification would have constituted an act
most congruent with More's natural law-based beliefs. More's initial
abstinence from overt rejection of the Acts of Supremacy and Succession
symbolizes his possible attempt at compromise with the King. While More
could not be labeled a true contextualist,' 3 ' his protracted public silence
certainly signifies a marginal embrace of the contextual compromise
between personal beliefs and professional expectations.
32
to condemne me (God knoweth howe) I will nowe in discharge of my conscience speake my
minde plainlye and freely touching my Inditment and your Statute withall.") (quoting More).
126 More would often confide in his daughter Margaret as to the reasons why he could not
take the Oath of Supremacy. See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 374 (stating that More made it clear
to his daughter that he could not "be swayed from the dictates of his conscience"). For more
authority noting More's insistence on reserving his protest of Henry's Acts of Succession and
Supremacy to private conversations, see generally BOLT, supra note 3, at 48-56, 77-79;
CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 311; Fox supra note 2, at 111-14; KENNY, supra note 2, at 72-87;
MARIUS, supra note 2, at 470-71, 492-99; REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 302-03; ROUTH, supra
note 2, at 216-19.
127 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing More's beliefs in natural law).
128 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 14 (documenting the strength of More's convictions).130 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (explaining that natural law is connected
to humanity because natural law is created by the Supreme Being, the foundation of human
existence).
13 1 A study of More's history leads to the inescapable conclusion that his natural law-based
principles were the most significant and dominant influences on his judgments, choices, and
actions. For a summary of the historical facts which document the strength of More's beliefs, see
supra notes 14, 17, 34-35 and accompanying text.
132 Of course, More's attempted "compromise" or "accommodation" by silence was
unsuccessful from the standpoint of his personal life. See supra note 4 and accompanying text
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Perhaps More's compromise through initial silence demonstrates the
virtual inevitability of contextual decision-making. An adjudicator, even
one who adheres strictly to natural law-based principles, would utilize
some measure of context as she applies those principles to humanistic
circumstances. The application of legal rules to specific problems or
controversies remains a contextual exercise. 33  Thus, even the most
stalwart natural law proponents cannot avoid context as a variable in the
interpretation of legal rules and prudent decision-making.
An adjudicator who is strongly influenced by natural law, however,
might restrict the reality of context to that which preserves world order in
accordance with her natural law-based norms. Such a limited contextual
application signals the dominance of natural law in decision-making. This
rationale explains, to some extent, More's initial, contextual strategy of
public silence. Societal order during that time would not have been served
by a public debate on his crusade to the seeming illegitimacy of the King's
proclamations. Private protest of these proclamations furthers a cognitive
balance between beliefs grounded in natural law and its tendency to foster
humankind and further societal order, and expectations of the sovereign
which are expressed in terms of positive law. Those like Thomas More
naturally gravitate toward contextual compromise that can balance
competing values.
(noting that decapitation was the result of More's silent "compromise"). However, even if he had
succeeded in avoiding the King's wrath through silence, I dare say that cognitive dissonance
would have still plagued More because he failed to openly oppose that which was in total
contravention of his natural law-based beliefs. See supra note 125.
133 See Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277,
398 (1985) (arguing that application of law to fact equates to moral reasoning by decision-makers
engaged in this exercise). See generally Morant, supra note 66, at 103-04 (arguing for a more
contextual interpretation and application of contract rules). A number of scholars have
acknowledged the importance of a contextual approach to the scrutiny of legal problems. See
David R. Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles of Judges
and Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. PiTT. L. REv. 127, 158-59 (1988) (noting that judicial
decisions must be analyzed by examining whether justice is realized in particular legal
situations); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1479-82 (1987) (stating that, in interpreting statutory and common law, judges consider the
current social, political and legal context); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 373-78 (1990) (discussing the
force of evolution considerations in judicial statutory interpretations). For a discussion of the
importance of race as a contextual element in legal pedagogy, see generally Frances Lee Ansley,
Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1511-13 (1991).
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II. THE RELEVANCE OF THOMAS MORE'S DILEMMA TO THE
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF LAW
Perhaps a seminal issue in this discussion remains the contemporary
relevance of More's dilemma of conscience. I posit that the conflict More
confronted more than 450 years ago resonates with many present-day
practitioners. Like Thomas More, today's lawyers bring to the practice of
law personally held beliefs. 3 4  While they may not be as theologically
oriented as those of More, these beliefs nonetheless constitute strong
cognitive influences on all forms of decision-making, 135 including the
prioritization of cases or controversies and the legal reasoning required to
resolve them. The following specific examples highlight the potential
impact of beliefs on decision-making: Would the lawyer who believes that
abortion is morally unjust represent physicians who routinely perform
abortions? 136  Can the prosecutor who believes that the death penalty
violates personally held beliefs associated with terminating human life,
zealously prosecute someone accused of capital murder? 37  Would an
1s4 See infra Part II.B (discussing the pervasiveness of personally held beliefs in decision-
making); see also infra note 193 (noting, from a psychological perspective, the extraordinary
influence of personal beliefs on decision-making).
135 See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
136 See Teresa Stanton Collett, Speak No Evil, Seek No Evil, Do No Evil. Client Selection
and Cooperation With Evil, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1998). The author argues that a
Catholic attorney's religious convictions should play a determinative role her selection of clients.
Id. at 1339-40. The author also notes the Tennessee Bar Association's decision that "a pro-life
Catholic lawyer has a professional obligation to accept court appointed representation of a minor
seeking an abortion." Id. at 1359 n.80. See also David Barnhizer, Princes of Darkness andAngels
of Light: The Soul of the American Lawyer, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 371,
431-32 (2000) (arguing that the pro-choice lawyer owes a duty to herself to not represent a client
who wants to picket an abortion clinic); Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary of Pro-life Free Speech:
A Lesson from the Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. REV. 853, 880-81 (1999) (noting Harvard Law
Professor Robert H. Mnookin's belief that young lawyers representing the state in challenges to
anti-abortion legislation often fail to offer a vigorous defense when armed with conflicting
personal belief that abortion should not be restricted).
137 See Jill Jones, The Christian Executioner: Reconciling "An Eye for an Eye" With "Turn
the Other Cheek", 27 PEPP. L. REV. 127, 135 (1999) ("[I]t would be difficult for the prosecutor
who questions the moral validity of capital punishment to zealously prosecute a capital case and
argue for imposition of the death penalty."); Jason M. Schoenberg, Note, Making the
Constitutional Cut: Evaluating New York's Death Penalty Statute in Light of the Supreme
Court's Capital Punishment Mandates, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 337, 380-82 (1999) (arguing that, in New
York, the lack of standards guiding a prosecutor's discretion to seek the death penalty may lead
to arbitrary imposition and different sentences for similarly situated defendants in different
jurisdictions, depending on the individual beliefs of the prosecutor); cf David B. Wilkins,
Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502,
1509-10 (1998) (noting an African-American district attorney's refusal to seek the death penalty
because of his belief that it is intrinsically racist).
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attorney whose beliefs are strongly rooted in religion and who regularly
represents those whose civil liberties have been abridged accept as a client
and zealously represent an atheist who challenges school prayer?
Dilemmas of conscience also surface in less sensational, more
mundane legal situations. For example, what advice would an attorney
give a major corporate client whose business practices routinely violate
state and federal environmental regulations? How would an associate in a
law firm respond when the partner demands she cease work on a project
due to the client's failure to pay, notwithstanding the merit of the client's
claim?
There are no universal answers for these rather prevalent ethical
questions. The differing strengths of belief systems, together with the
individualized perceptions of professional expectations, ensure differing
responses from the attorneys who face these problems. Perhaps more
important than answers is an appreciation of the impact of conflicting
values on decision-making focused on the search for possible solutions.
A. Adherence to Conviction Versus Accommodation of the Sovereign-A
Contemporary Narrative
Contemporary lawyers, at certain times during their careers confront
dilemmas of conscience.' 38 The following narrative from and to some
extent, my early years of practice not only proves the prevalence of this
dilemma, but also underscores the complexity of decision-making required
to resolve it.
As a lawyer in the United States Army Judge Advocate General's
Corps (J.A.G. Corps.), I was assigned to the Office of the Staff Judge
Advocate of the 18th Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In
addition to the 18 th Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg also served as the host
installation for the 82nd Airborne Division and the Special Forces
Operation more commonly known as the Green Berets. 139 These highly
specialized, combat-ready units routinely conducted exercises in wooded
areas located on the installation. Dominated by pine trees and scrub
138 See supra notes 136-37 (providing examples of these dilemmas).
139 See generally XVIII Airbourne Corp & Fort Bragg, Announcements, at
http://www.bragg.army.miIl8abn/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2004) (identifying the 18th Airboume
Corps and the 82nd Airboume Division as part of Fort Bragg, N.C.).
[Vol.78:965
THOMAS MORE'S DILEMMA OF CONSCIENCE
growth, these wooded areas were populated by various fauna, including the
endangered red-cockaded woodpecker.
140
Military exercises, which usually included artillery fire and the
sizeable movement of personnel and materiel in wooded areas of the
installation, disturbed the red-cockaded woodpecker's habitat. This
development became my first, and perhaps most polemic, assignment as a
licensed attorney: Determine whether commanders, pursuant to military'
4 1
and federal regulations, 142 had a legal duty to modify training procedures in
order to secure the habitat of the red-cockaded woodpecker.
While my assignment lacked the dramatic urgency of Thomas More's
consideration of King Henry VIII's proclamations, '43 it did pose strikingly
similar ethical issues. I was acutely aware that post commanders, who also
were my superior officers, would have been chagrined by a suggestion to
interrupt or modify training operations, irrespective of reasons related to
environmental concerns. Like Thomas More, who perhaps knew that
refusal to endorse Henry VIII's proclamations might lead to reprisal,' 44 I
perceived that command displeasure with a legal opinion that insisted upon
a change in operations could have adversely impacted my military career.
Also similar to More, my personal beliefs influenced, to some degree, my
approach to decision-making. Aside from the belief that rare living species
must be preserved, 145 I firmly respected the rule of law. 146 Although that
140 For a description of the red-cockaded woodpecker and the southern states' modification
of its habitat, see generally ROBERT W. MCFARLANE, A STILLNESS IN THE PINES: THE ECOLOGY
OF THE RED-COCKADED WOODPECKER (1992); see also National Wildlife Federation,
Redcockaded Woodpecker, at http://www.nwf.org/wildlife/redcockadedwoodpecker/ (last visited
Sept. 23, 2004) (noting the current endangered status of the red-cockaded woodpecker).
141 For military guidelines regarding endangered and threatened species, see generally
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 200-3, NATURAL RESOURCES-LAND, FOREST AND
WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT, ch.11 (1995). For the current federal guidelines governing the
military's implementation of the Endangered Species Act see Interagency Cooperation-
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 50 C.F.R. § 402 (2003).
142 For current federal laws regarding the conservation of endangered species, see generally
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a) (2000). This Act was in effect in 1979
and governed the military's interaction with the habitat of endangered species at that time. Id.
143 Thomas More's refusal to endorse Henry VIII's proclamations to become head of the
church and to vest his issue of Anne Boleyn as his successes is heavily documented. See
generally ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 347-393; CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 236-39; GUY, supra
note 2, at 113-20; KENNY, supra note 2, at 62-90; MARIUS, supra note 2, at 371-493; MARTZ,
supra note 2 at 5; REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 226-371; ROUTH, supra note 2, at 168-236.
144 See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 347-58 (noting the King's anger after learning of
More's refusal to endorse his proclamations).
145 One might surmise that an intense belief in the preservation of life of any form has a
theological basis. See supra notes 39-42, 130-31 and accompanying text. Of course, the fervor
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cognition might not have matched More's depth of fervently held personal
beliefs, 147 it nonetheless, remained an indelible and dominant factor in my
review of subsequent legal matters. I was, thus, confronted with a
dilemma similar in character-if not in scope or import-to that of
Thomas More: Should I review this matter with the intent to fulfill the
expectations of post commanders, or render an objective legal opinion
without regard to these expectations and the possible consequences?
Unlike Thomas More's dilemma of conscience, however, the conflict
of values I confronted did not carry life-threatening consequences. Yet the
eventual legal opinion's potential impact on my career factored heavily in
my decision-making.
with which one holds those beliefs would impact the willingness and compulsion to adhere to
those beliefs.
146 While my view of "rule of law" focuses on conformity with established legal rules and
precedent, I readily acknowledge the many other conceptualizations of the doctrine. See Veronica
M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in
Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 133 n.27 (1994) (quoting INTERPRETING
STATUTES 535 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991)). The author describes
the Rule of Law as an internally complex doctrine that promotes the proper exercise of legislative
power by stressing clear ex ante legislation, banning or restricting retrospections, and stipulating
reasonable generality, clarity and constancy in the law. See also Arthur L. Goodhart, The Rule of
Law and Absolute Sovereignty, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 943, 949 (1958) ("[l]n the United States the
emphasis is placed primarily on the control of the federal and state legislatures by the rule of law
as expressed in the Constitution, while in Great Britain and France the interest is centered almost
entirely on the control of the executive."); Francis J. Mootz III, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a
Postmodern World?, 68 WASH. L. REv. 249, 268-69 (1993) (noting Geoffrey de Q. Walker's
defense of the Rule of Law as promoting the balance of law and power); Laurie Anne Whitt,
Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual Property & The New Imperial Science, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REv. 211, 247-48 (1998) (noting that rule of law doctrines such as the observance of precedent
and faithfulness to historical practices result in the incorporation of a conservative bias into the
law); Thomas M. Riordan, Comment, Copping an Attitude: Rule of Law Lessons from the
Rodney King Incident, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 675, 717 (1994) (arguing that "the rule of law works
only if the citizens maintain an attitude of legality," however, civil disobedience is not
inconsistent with respect for the law, but rather a "manifestation of the prophylactic function of
the attitude of legality"); Sandra Lynne Tholen & Lisa Baird, Comment, Con Law Is As Con Law
Does: A Survey of Planned Parenthood v. Casey in the State and Federal Courts, 28 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 971, n.577 (1995) (noting that under California's rule of law doctrine, the rule necessary to
decide a case conclusively establishes the rule in that case as well as the rights of the parties in
any retrial or appeal of that case).
147 Jeff Powell, who analyzed Robert Bolt's play, A Man for All Seasons, summarized the
strength of More's conviction in the principle or rule of law which functions "as doctrine and
tradition [that] makes political community possible among people with divergent interests and
perspectives who wish to be citizens-not subjects." Markovits, supra note 11, at 329 n.22
(quoting Powell, supra note 8, at 408).
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Applicable federal and military regulations, which can be
characterized as positive law, 148 compelled an objective evaluation of the
legal controversy. 149  The expectations of post commanders, however,
loomed as a powerful constraint on objectivity.150  The language of
regulations, both military and federal, appeared to limit actions that
adversely impacted endangered species.'15  Operations that directly
impinged on the habitat of threatened species such as the red-cockaded
woodpecker required modification, if not termination. 152 These legal rules
and my belief in the rule of law initially dominated my decision-making.
The resultant draft opinion advised commanders to find alternative sites for
various military operations. Knowledge of the post commanders'
expectations, and the possible repercussions from a legal opinion that
frustrated those expectations, prompted my closer scrutiny of the opinion's
first draft.
I, thereafter, reexamined the regulations to discover a plausible
alternative to the complete cessation of military drills in wooded areas
where the red-cockaded woodpecker proliferated. This search for an
alternative solution represented a contextual compromise that, to some
degree, might accommodate post commanders' expectations. Such a
compromise, if well crafted, would not have offended my belief in the rule
148 Because they are issued by a sovereign, the legislature, or a legislative or executive
agency, statutes and regulations constitute prototypical positive law. See supra notes 78-81 and
accompanying text (providing one definition of positive law as being prescriptions given by the
sovereign).
149 See supra notes 79-81. My more pluralistic definition of the term, "sovereign"
complicates the positive law aspects of this particular legal assignment. The regulations
governing endangered species constituted archetypical positive law, given their genesis from
traditional sovereign power, the legislature or its agency. See supra note 20.
150 Note that the expectations of the post commanders, who under my more pluralized
definition, were tantamount to sovereign will. See supra note 20 (providing my more broad
definition of the term "sovereign").
151 Section 11-2(b) of Army Regulation 200-3 requires the Army, in compliance with
section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act, to refrain from any operations "likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any listed [endangered] species or result in the destruction
or adverse modification of critical habitat." ARMY REGULATION 200-3, supra note 137, at ch. 11-
2(b). In the event the Army anticipates any such operation, the regulation sets forth the specific
requirements mandated by the Endangered Species Act as to the formal consultations with the
Fish and Wildlife Service necessary to determine the impact on the habitat of those species.
152 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
Each Federal agency shall ... insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out
by such agency ... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species.
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of law. In this case, the compromise constituted an addendum which
recommended an adjustment to the timing of certain drills, and training
modifications that would reduce noise pollution. 
153
Similar to More's initial compromise of public silence, 154 my
minimalist compromise, focused on scheduling changes and noise
reduction tactics, failed to appease my military sovereigns. They believed
that any disruption to unit operations, regardless of degree or reason,
constituted an unreasonable infringement on military operations. Unlike
Henry VIII, who faulted Thomas More for his refusal to endorse his
objectives, my military sovereigns did not hold me responsible for the
ultimate opinion that affected drills on post. They, instead, blamed those
who drafted the applicable regulations.
Despite the lack of a discernable negative impact of this review on my
career, the potentiality of impact became a recurrent and pervasive
consideration in future assignments. Moreover, conflicts between personal
beliefs and professional expectations resurfaced periodically throughout
my legal career.
The applicability, to some extent, of Thomas More's dilemma to the
modem practice of law raises a critical question: Can lawyers successfully
reconcile the periodic conflict between personal beliefs and professional
expectations? Perhaps there is no definitive, universal answer to this
question. I nonetheless submit that a greater understanding of the
influence of this conflict on decision-making constitutes a critical and
useful step toward the discovery of a solution.
153 Compromise constitutes one tactic which could reduce the dissonance associated with
contradictory beliefs. For a general discussion of dissonance-reduction strategies, see infra note
163 and accompanying text. It should be noted that contemporary J.A.G. Corps officers who
review military actions for conformity with certain environmental laws will likely encounter less
troublesome dilemmas of conscience than I. President George W. Bush relaxed various
environmental requirements for the military in H.R. 1588, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2004, which was passed by Congress and codified in Public Law No. 108-
136 on November 24, 2003. Section 318(B)(i) of the statute, titled Military Readiness and
Conservation of Protected Species, limits the Secretary of the Interior's ability to "designate as
critical habitat any lands ... owned or controlled by the [DOD], or designated for its use, that are
subject to an integrated natural resources management plan .... " National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 318, 117 Stat. 1433, 1433 (2003)
(amending 16 U.S.C § 1533(a)(3)).
154 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (explaining how Thomas More's refusal
to openly oppose or criticize Henry VIII's proclamations was tantamount to a tacit attempt at
compromise between his personally held beliefs and accommodation of professional expectations
in the form of the sovereign's will).
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B. The Psychological Implications of Dilemmas of Conscience-
Cognitive Dissonance and the Psychology of Choice
Perhaps the quest to resolve conflicting beliefs and expectations
should commence with an understanding of the tensions created when
those conflicts actually occur. Beliefs, as a cognitive norm, function as
mental guideposts during any decision-making process. 55 The strength of
an individual's commitment to their beliefs will ultimately govern the
extent to which those beliefs will control behavior. Thomas More's
historical narrative clearly demonstrates his powerful personal belief
system, which was so endemic to his personhood that it dominated every
facet of his life, including his approach to legal reasoning. 156 Alternatively,
my inherent belief in the rule of law, while a normative construct of my
decision-making, could be tempered occasionally by interpretations which
attempt to balance competing contextual factors in a legal problem.1
57
Thus, contextual variables may prompt behavior modification, or even the
abandonment of beliefs, when the individual's commitment to those beliefs
lacks fervor or strength. 58  For example, an individual's fundamental
belief that one must be truthful might be abandoned in order to spare
another person's feelings. 5 9  Principles of social psychology offer
considerable insight into the stimulus for this behavior.
Once forced to confront competing value systems or attitudes, an
individual may experience cognitive dissonance. 60  Dissonance results
when an individual holds two or more cognitions, i.e., beliefs, ideas,
155 See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 5-8, 117-20 (1995); see also MICHAEL
ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOUR 188 (5th ed. 1994) (stating that
"[v]alues and ideals function as restraints which control and inhibit certain spontaneous patterns
of behaviour"). See generally Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the
Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. 1NTERDISC. L.J. 375, 419
(1997); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL.
REV. 129 (1956).
156 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (noting the fervor with which More held
his personal beliefs, which were rooted in natural law-based, moral principles).
157 See supra note 151-52 and accompanying text (describing my search for a contextual
compromise that would allow post commanders to conduct limited operations in areas that served
as the habitat for the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker).
158 See ARONSON, supra note 155, at 159 (noting that "subtle situational variables" may
have a strong impact on behavior).
1 59 See ARGYLE, supra note 155, at 188 (stating that while truth has value in many cultures,
those very same cultures may also find it important not to hurt people's feelings or to please the
listener, both of which prompt abandonment of truth).
160 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (defining cognitive dissonance).
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attitudes, or opinions, which are contradictory. 16' The failure to resolve
this conflict results in a cognitive imbalance that produces tension, stress,
or some similar emotional response. 162 The resulting discomfort usually
prompts the sufferer to work diligently to reduce this dissonance. 163 To
achieve dissonance reduction, an individual may modify her beliefs or
attitudes. These modifications tend to validate behavior resulting from the
clash of beliefs.' 64
The theory of cognitive dissonance might be best understood through
the following example. S, who has been a diligent worker for over twenty-
five years and has always been prudent financially, has surmised that
pensions and social security alone would not provide sufficient income
during retirement. She further adopts the view that an individual must save
as much discretionary income as possible to supplement retirement
income. Thus, for more than twenty-five years, S has deposited her federal
tax refund check into an individual retirement account (IRA). To
maximize her yearly deposits in the IRA, S purposely has withheld from
her weekly paycheck a greater than sufficient amount of federal income tax
payments. On her fiftieth birthday, a time at which she feels an elevated
sense of mortality, S decides to forgo saving this year's refund check. She
instead uses the refund to supplement a down payment for a new Mercedes
convertible, which she believes would cure the malaise over her age.
The divergence of the tax refund from her annuity to a payment for a
luxury car will likely produce dissonance for S.165 Rather than adhere to
her belief in saving, she engages in behavior motivated by a contrary belief
that spending assuages negative feelings related to age. To reduce the
dissonance caused by her conflicting beliefs, S may employ one of three
procedures. She might instead modify her original belief that an individual
161 See ARONSON, supra note 155, at 178; NICKY HAYES, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 99 (1993).
162 See HAYES, supra note 161, at 99 (defining cognitive dissonance as a "cognitive
imbalance" which is inherently stressful); ANN L. WEBER, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 235
(1991) (noting that Leon Festinger, widely regarded as the originator of cognitive dissonance
theory, found that dissonance occurs when there is a "mismatch" between attitudes and behavior
that creates "disharmony"); see also ARONSON, supra note 155, at 178 (noting that holding two
contradictory beliefs "flirt[s] with absurdity").
163 See ARONSON, supra note 155; WEBER, supra note 162, at 235.
164 See WEBER, supra note 162, at 235 (explaining that individuals change their attitudes so
that they are harmonious with recent behavior in order to reduce tension created by conflicting
attitudes).
165 See supra notes 13, 160-64 and accompanying text.
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must save all discretionary income for retirement. She would then opine
that one must occasionally allocate some surplus revenue for unexpected
necessities or exigencies. Of course, this modification also requires S to
justify the purchase of a Mercedes as necessary or exigent.' 66 Another
dissonance reduction tactic is the supplementation of beliefs. If S employs
this strategy, she might add a cognition that is congruent with her use of
the tax refund to purchase the Mercedes. 67 Thus, she might heighten the
utility of a Mercedes, opining that a new car is safer and more reliable than
her present vehicle. Perhaps more important, a new car, particularly a high
performance vehicle, makes S feel better about herself and, thus, assuages
any depression attributed to her fear of growing older.
S might also attempt to reduce dissonance through the compromise of
her contradictory beliefs. One such compromise might involve the
allocation of discretionary income tax refund needs that conform to both
beliefs. Thus, S might save a portion of the refund, and use the remainder
to fund the down payment for the new car.
The hypothetical involving S basically reveals the thought processes
that occur when contradictory beliefs clash. Harboring contradictory
beliefs not only produces tension, but also suggests to S that her choices,
perhaps even her life, are absurdities. 168 These overwhelming cognitive
results compel S to reduce dissonance through belief modification,
cognitive addition, or compromise. Implementation of one or more
dissonance-reduction tactics may relieve S's tension and confirm that her
choices are not absurd.
169
Cognitive dissonance theory offers predictive insight into behavior
influenced by conflicting beliefs, and forms the catalyst to search for a
contextual accommodation that resolves the conflict between beliefs and
166 See Valerie Fointiat, Rationalization in Act and Problematic Behaviour Justification, 28
EuR. J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 471 (1998) (arguing that rationalization is "achieved either by a post-
readjustment of the cognitive representations to make them conform to the reality of the
behaviour just accomplished--cognitive rationalization-or by performing another behavior,
more problematic than the one that aroused the dissonance-rationalization in act").
167 See ARONSON, supra note 155, at 178-79.
168 See id. (stating that holding contradictory ideas "flirt[s] with absurdity").
169 Id. More detailed explanations of cognitive dissonance and dissonance reduction
strategies, particularly with examples, are available. See id. at 179-83 (using as an example the
individual who smokes despite the belief that smoking causes cancer); HAYES, supra note 157, at
100 (describing Festinger et al. studies of religious cult members and subjects asked to perform
boring tasks for pay); WEBER, supra note 158, at 235-36 (employing as an example shift in
product preferences related to taste and pricing).
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expectations. It accordingly has probative relevance to Thomas More's
dilemma of conscience.
Moralistic principles rooted in theology dominated More's personally
held beliefs. 70 Ancillary to these beliefs was his sense of duty and loyalty
to the sovereign 171 to whom a lawyer should remain loyal. 172  More's
natural law-based beliefs 73 and his duty to Henry VIII, his sovereign,
whose acts were contrary to those beliefs,1 74 likely contributed to some
measure of cognitive dissonance. The totality of his conduct reveals a
complex paradox of behavior with psychological overtones. As previously
described in this Article, prior to his actual denunciation of the King's acts,
More sought an accommodation by silence. While he disapproved of the
King's Acts-particularly the Acts of Succession-he chose to withhold
any comment on these proclamations. 175 He saw this "policy of silence" as
a contextual accommodation or compromise. 76  That action-perhaps
more accurately termed "inaction"-may have marginally reduced the
discomfort associated with countering the King's proclamations. 77 It also
caused More some degree of dissonance, given that the King's acts were so
entirely incongruous with his theologically based beliefs. The strength of
his beliefs and the blatant illegality of these Acts should have prompted
More to shout their invalidity from the rooftops. Instead, he attempted to
appease the King, and himself, through this code of silence. That action,
though mild and designed to reduce the dissonance associated with
frustrating the expectations of the King to whom he owed a duty, must
170 See supra notes 30, 35-36 and accompanying text.
171 See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 320-21 (noting More's dedication and loyalty as the
King's servant); see also MARIUS, supra note 2, at 361-62.
172 See ACKROYD, supra note 2, at 295-96 (documenting More's dedication to duty as a
lawyer in promoting justice upon the foundation of the law of reason); MARIUS, supra note 2, at
361-62; see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, at Canon 4 ("A Lawyer Should Preserve the
Confidences and Secrets of a Client"); id. at Canon 5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent
Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client"); id. at Canon 6 ("A Lawyer Should Represent a
Client Competently"); id. at Canon 7 ("A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within
the Bounds of the Law").
173 See supra notes 39-66 and accompanying text (describing More's personally held
beliefs as natural law principles).
174 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 120, 125-33, 155 and accompanying text (explaining More's initial
silence regarding Henry VIII's proclamations as a contextual approach to his dilemma of
conscience).
176 Id.
177 See supra note 169 and accompanying text (explaining dissonance reduction in the form
of modification of beliefs or addition of cognition).
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have caused More some measure of dissonance. He undoubtedly suffered
discomfort from his silence on such a blatant violation of his core beliefs.
This discomfort must have been considerably more tolerable than the
dissonance associated with an open endorsement of the King's
proclamation-the latter constituting a clear abandonment of his personally
held beliefs. Modification of these natural law-based beliefs, even to
accommodate a significant duty to a sovereign, would have arguably
resulted in substantially greater discomfort for More. 17
8
Of course, during his trial-and once the policy of silence failed-
More finally expressed publicly the illegality of the King's proclamations
and ultimately acted in accordance with his personally held beliefs. 79 That
final denunciation, which comported squarely with his personal beliefs,
must have reduced any dissonance associated with his failure to appease
the sovereign.'
80
Cognitive dissonance also explains, to some extent, the decision-
making related to my review of the military's conformity with applicable
environmental regulations.' 81 Similar to More, I experienced dissonance
when my personal beliefs-rule of law, supplemented by an ancillary
belief in the preservation of endangered species-conflicted with the will
of the military sovereign--continuity of military drills that might adversely
impact the species habitat. 82 Yet unlike More, I attempted to reduce that
dissonance through belief modification'83 and compromise184 I broadened
178 See HAYES, supra note 161, at 101 (opining that those with strong beliefs tend to be
more resistant to information that is contradictory to those beliefs, and that those individuals will
defend against that contradictory information).
179 Nothing more dramatically emphasizes Thomas More's devotion to his natural law-
based beliefs than a line from the screenplay, A Man For All Seasons, in which More, facing
death for his refusal to endorse Henry VIII's proclamations, states: "I die his majesty's good
servant, but God's first." A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (Columbia Pictures 1966), supra note 3. For
more details regarding the 1966 motion picture, see VIDEOHOUND'S GOLDEN MOVIE RETRIEVER
533 (Martin Connors & Jim Craddock, eds., 1998).
180 See HAYES, supra note 161, at 101 (noting that those whose beliefs are strong have a
tendency to defend those beliefs by discrediting the contradictory information or its source). In
the screenplay for the film, A Man For All Seasons, More rejects Henry VIII's proclamations
when, during his post-trial statement, he declares that "[t]he act of Parliament is directly
repugnant to the law of God, His Holy Church, the Supreme Government ... " A MAN FOR ALL
SEASONS (Columbia Pictures 1966), supra note 3. For more discussion of More's rejection of
Henry VIII's proclamation, see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
1 8 1 See supra notes 138-53 and accompanying text (describing my legal review of the
Army's interaction with the habitat of the red-cockaded woodpecker at Fort Bragg).
182 See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing modification as a method to
decrease dissonance).
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my personal belief in the rule of law to include what I perceived were
significant objectives of the sovereign-uninterrupted military drills. I,
therefore, opined that regulations applicable to endangered species were
not absolute, and instead were subject to contextual interpretation.' 85 This
modification permitted a more pragmatic interpretation of the applicable
regulations. 86  My recommended solutions changed from absolute
cessation of any military actions in areas inhabited by the red-cockaded
woodpecker, to temperance of operations that impact that endangered
species.
187
As previously explained, the compromise between competing beliefs
may reduce dissonance. 188  Compromise has considerable appeal as a
dissonance-reducer since it does not require complete abandonment of
either contrary belief. In the review of actions affecting the red-cockaded
woodpecker, my final recommendation to either alter the timing or
character of military operations conforms to the rule of law, and
accommodates the sovereign's objective of continued drills. This
compromise potentially balances my competing beliefs in the rule of law
and duty to one's sovereign--or client. Despite its conceptual appeal and
potential effectiveness, compromise can produce mixed results.
Regardless of the credibility of cognitive dissonance theory, 8 9 it
seems clear that the compelling nature of professional expectations can
easily prompt an adjustment, or even abandonment, of personally held
beliefs. As presented in the narrative related to my review of military
operations in areas populated by the endangered red-cockaded
woodpecker, the post commanders' expectation of uninterrupted,
undisturbed training operations caused me to revise my original legal
opinion that strictly interpreted the governing federal and military
regulations. 90  This accommodation of the sovereign's expectations
constitutes a compromise that potentially reconciles the clash between
184 See supra note 153 and accompanying text (explaining compromise as a measure against
dissonance).
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 See id. (describing compromise as a dissonance-reduction tool or technique.)
189 See ARONSON, supra note 155, at 229-37 (presenting cogent criticism of cognitive
dissonance theory).
190 See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text (explaining my decision to alter the
original legal review of military drills to permit some limited form of operations in the areas
where the red-cockaded woodpecker inhabited).
1004 [Vol.78:965
THOMAS MORE'S DILEMMA OF CONSCIENCE
beliefs and expectations. As the psychological literature documents, the
efficacy of compromise depends upon the strength of personally held
beliefs and the compelling nature of expectations of the sovereign.19'
Thomas More's struggle with Henry VIII and my review of military
operations in the areas inhabited by an endangered species highlight the
difficulties associated with compromise. In Thomas More's dilemma, his
natural law-based beliefs were too strong to permit a significant
accommodation of Henry VIII's objectives. He, therefore, could only
offer public silence, a relatively benign tactic that failed to appease the
monarch. 192 My professional dilemma differed from More's, in that my
belief in the rule of positive law would permit a reasonable interpretation
that accommodates contextual variables such as the continuity of military
operations. I therefore could fashion a more significant accommodation or
compromise which consisted of the modification of drills conducted in the
red-cockaded woodpecker's habitat. Although my belief system permitted
a somewhat significant accommodation, the post commanders initially
thought their objective of uninterrupted drills was too compelling to allow
compromise. 1
93
Perhaps the complexity of the dilemma of conscience and the
resultant attempts to alleviate any associated dissonance 194 relate to the
respective strengths and consequences of competing beliefs. Beliefs,
particularly those that are contradictory, figuratively exist at opposite ends
of a continuum. Within the space of this continuum are potential solutions
that reconcile the clash created by conflicting beliefs. These solutions,
which include belief modification' 95 and compromise, 196 often function
dually to relieve cognitive dissonance, and fulfill, to some extent,
professional expectations. The pull toward either end of this continuum
191 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing compromise as a contextual
modification between personal beliefs and sovereign edicts).
192 See supra notes 125-132 and accompanying text (discussing More's abstinence from
public rejection of Henry VIII's proclamations as a tacit compromise offered to resolve the
conflict between his natural law-based beliefs and the King's expectations).
193 See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text (providing the factual background of my
attempt to accommodate post commanders' desire for uninterrupted drills). I should mention that,
despite initial rejection of my compromise, post commanders ultimately modified their
operations to minimize adverse impacts on the red-cockaded woodpecker.
194 See supra notes 160-64, 169-88 and accompanying text (explaining the relevance of
cognitive dissonance).
195 See supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing modification as method to
decrease dissonance).
196 See supra note 153 and accompanying text (explaining compromise as tactic to reduce
dissonance).
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depends upon the comparative strengths of personally held beliefs and
professional expectations. Personally held beliefs generally have greater
cognitive dominance given their inherent, natural, and default-like
employment during decision-making. 197  Thus, in the case of Thomas
More, notorious commitment to his dominant, natural law-based beliefs
explain his extraordinary adherence to those beliefs, and his ultimate
rejection of any appeasement of the King's and Cromwell's expectations.
The extraordinary strength of More's personally held beliefs prevented any
demonstrative movement on the continuum toward the sovereign's
expectations.
If, however, the strength of the belief in the appeasement of the
sovereign's expectations is equal to, or exceeds, that of contrary,
personally held beliefs, an individual might choose one of the following
options within the continuum: (1) fulfillment of professional expectations
despite the resultant conflict with personally held beliefs; (2) modification
of personally held beliefs to accommodate, to some extent, professional
expectations; or (3) implementation of a compromise between personally
held beliefs and professional expectations, with the assessment of
consequence as a possible catalyst for that compromise. These alternatives
move the individual toward that end of the belief continuum associated
with appeasement of the sovereign.
Other variables in the continuum of beliefs and expectations are the
attendant consequences from one's choice of behavior. One's estimation
197 In some ways, personally held beliefs function similar to heuristics, a cognitive process
in which are shortcuts used to process information efficiently. See ARONSON, supra note 155, at
5-8, 117-120 (providing examples of the impact of social influences on cognitive processes).
See generally Hal R. Arkes, Costs and Benefits of Judgment Errors: Implications for Debiasing,
110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 486 (1991) (noting generally the efficiency in streamlining informational
processes, which ultimately affects behavior); Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 151, at 419
(discussing how, in decision-making, people use mental shortcuts because of limited time,
information, and cognitive capacity, which sometimes lead to miscalculations); Herbert A.
Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REv. 129, 133-34
(1956) (dealing with people's decision-making when faced with multiple goals asserting that
rational behavior is closely related to perception and cognition). As a result, beliefs become
automatic response mechanisms, unless individuals consciously disregard or modify those
beliefs. See generally Amos Tuersky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1974); Steven J. Sherman & Eric Corty, Cognitive Heuristics, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 189-286 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 1984)
(providing examples of how test subjects prior views on death penalty affected consideration of
subsequent evidence).
1006 [Vol.78:44
THOMAS MORE'S DILEMMA OF CONSCIENCE
of the severity of consequences resulting from the choice between beliefs
and expectations may influence movement along the continuum.
In More's case, he must have envisioned the potentially harsh
retribution that would have resulted from his refusal to endorse Henry
VIII's proclamations. This consequence, coupled with his duty to serve
the King, likely strengthened the polarity of expectation on his continuum.
Perhaps more compelling, however, was the consequence associated with
the abandonment of his natural law-based beliefs. To More, such an
abandonment was tantamount to losing one's sense of self, one's
personhood. Bolt vividly dramatized More's feelings on this issue in A
Man for All Seasons. In one of the play's latter scenes, More, imprisoned
for his refusal to endorse the King's proclamations, stated to his daughter,
Margaret Roper: "When a man takes an oath, he's holding his own self in
his own hands like water. And if he opens his fingers then, he needn't
hope to find himself again .... ,198 Thus for More, losing one's
personhood, which was a consequence of the abandonment of personal
beliefs, was more compelling than the inevitability of death, the
consequence of frustrating Henry VIII's expectations. That assessment of
consequence likely contributed to More's inability to compromise in a
manner that required endorsement of the King's proclamations.
Of course, the weighing of beliefs and expectations and assessment of
their resultant consequences remain essentially personal exercises. More
found the consequences associated with the abandonment of personally
held beliefs compelling, and commensurately found the consequence of
frustrating the King's expectation more acceptable. However, others who
attempt to resolve their personal dilemmas of conscience might reach a
different result.
This analysis of beliefs and expectations has significant relevance to
my review of military operations conducted in the habitat of the red-
cockaded woodpecker. Despite my strong belief in the enforcement of
regulations promulgated to protect endangered species, I had an equally
compelling commitment-both as a lawyer and military officer-to fulfill
the post commanders' expectation of uninterrupted drills. The relative
strengths of my competing beliefs permitted movement toward
compromise within my continuum. 199 As a result, my actions contrasted
sharply with those of More, whose overwhelmingly strong natural law-
198 A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (Columbia Pictures 1966), supra note 3.
199 See supra note 153 and accompanying text (describing the compromise I forged in the
attempt to reconcile the potential conflict between regulations governing endangered species, and
appeasement of military commanders' expectation of uninterrupted drills).
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based beliefs prevented little movement on the continuum from those
convictions. 200  He could only manage the tacit compromise of public
silence, which was ultimately breached once he was convicted of
treason.20'
I also considered to some extent the possible consequences associated
with frustrating the expectations of my military sovereigns. Like More,
my assessment of those consequences essentially constituted an assessment
of risk. Could my original opinion that advocated the complete cessation
of drills have led to such ramifications as the loss of the professional
confidence of my military sovereigns, the devaluation of legal opinions I
would render in other matters, or my military sovereigns' reluctance to
seek legal advice before engaging in future missions? Of course, the
reality of these risks was speculative given my inability to determine
accurately the degree of dissatisfaction my original opinion might have
generated. It nonetheless remained an influential factor that, when
combined with the comparable strengths of beliefs and expectations,
dictated movement along my continuum of beliefs and expectations.20 2
The tension between beliefs and expectations and the assessment of
their respective consequences compel lawyers to adopt a rather unique
strategic focus as they confront dilemmas of conscience. In lieu of a rigid,
absolutist choice between adherence to beliefs or capitulation to sovereign
will and expectations, lawyers must appreciate the almost innate tendency
to achieve cognitive balance along the continuum of competing beliefs.
This quest for balance may not produce a model solution. However, it
should foster a greater understanding of the genesis, nature, and influence
of conflicting beliefs, in turn leading to more thorough and holistic
decision-making.0 3
200 See supra notes 34-35, 64-65 and accompanying text (explaining the strength of
Thomas More's personally held beliefs).
201 See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
202 The assessment of consequences often constitutes a predictive judgment. For More, the
probability of death as a result of frustrating Henry VIII's expectations was palpable. That said,
his, nonetheless, remained a calculated risk. In my case, the risk of consequence appeared more
speculative than that of More. I could only imagine the repercussions of a disfavored legal
opinion. It should be noted that my assessment of the consequences of my review remained
merely speculations. My military sovereigns adhered to the legal advice I rendered, and my
career in the J.A.G. Corps continued to flourish. I served proudly in coveted assignments until
my decision to leave military service for a career in the private sector.
203 For an excellent discussion of the factors lawyers must balance as they provide
competent representation with professionalism, see Barry Sullivan & Ellen S. Podgor, Respect,
Responsibility, and the Virtue of Introspection: An Essay on Professionalism in the Law School
Environment, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 117, 117-19 (2001).
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CONCLUSION
If we lived in a state where virtue was profitable, common sense would
make us saintly. But since avarice, anger, pride and stupidity commonly
profit beyond charity, modesty, justice, and thought, perhaps we must
stand fast a little, even at the risk of being heroes.
204
Thomas More's life, celebrated at St. Dunstan's Church, Canterbury,
England, symbolizes the strength of personal conviction and character to
which most lawyers arguably aspire. Perhaps the more compelling
observation from More's extraordinary story remains the dilemma of
conscience that resulted from his struggle to reconcile the tension between
his beliefs and sovereign expectations. More's dilemma has become
emblematic for contemporary lawyers who confront similar conflicts at
some point in their careers. Adherence to personally held beliefs is a
somewhat generic observation. The more probative points from More's
narrative are the lawyer's critical need to understand the basis for
conflicting beliefs and the subsequent duty to incorporate that
understanding into a search for solutions. Heightened awareness of the
impact of this conflict on reasoning constitutes the first and, perhaps, most
significant step toward discovery of effective solutions. These tacit, more
universally beneficial suggestions remain Thomas More's most profound
professional legacy.
204 A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (Columbia Pictures 1966), supra note 3 (providing Thomas
More's response to his daughter, Margaret Roper, who attempted to persuade More to take a
more contextual approach to his differences with Henry VIII).
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